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Abstract  
We show how trade and communication costs interact to shape the way firms organize their 
activities across space. We consider the following three organizational types: (i) integrated firms 
in which all activities are conducted at the same location, (ii) horizontal firms, which operate 
several plants producing the same good at different locations, and (iii) vertical firms, which 
perform distinct activities at separated locations. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the three types of organization to coexist within the same country, whereas firms located in the 
other country are all spatially integrated. We then study how trade and communication costs 
affect firms’ organizational choices. First, lower trade costs lead fewer firms to go multinational. 
By contrast, less expensive communication flows leads to more investment abroad. The reason 
for this difference in results is that the two types of spatial frictions differ in nature: in the 
proximity-concentration trade-off, lower trade costs weaken the need for proximity, while 
lower communication costs foster deconcentration. 
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1 Introduction
We observe a variety of organizational forms in the way firms conduct their activities in the space economy, as well as
various models that aim to explain the spatial fragmentation of firms (Antràs and Yeaple, 2014). To a large extent,
these models appeal, often indirectly and under different guises, to the concentration-proximity trade-off (Markusen,
1984; Brainard, 1997). The former term accounts for the various benefits associated with the concentration of means
in a small number of units and the latter for the wide range of impediments to the mobility of goods, people and
information. In this paper, we blend ingredients from economic geography and trade theory to investigate when and
why identical firms operating in the same environment choose simultaneously different spatial organizational forms.
To achieve our goal, we distinguish between trade and communication costs. This difference is critical because
communication and trade costs play different roles in the way firms competing in the international marketplace
organize their activities across locations. Communication costs stem from coordinating complementary and spatially
separated specialized workers, whereas transport costs are a special case of production costs that are paid to make
available at a particular location a good produced in another.
Even since the Industrial Revolution, trade costs have plummeted. Nevertheless, they remain a major impediment
to trade and exchange, as shown by the many estimations of the gravity equation (Head and Mayer, 2014). Since trade
costs stand for the costs of coordinating and connecting transactions between supplier and customer locations, it has
long been recognized that many firms operate several plants that supply spatially separated markets (Beckenstein,
1975; Markusen, 1984). What is more, firms are packages of different functions, such as management, R&D, finance,
marketing, and production. Due to the development of new information and communication technologies (ICT),
firms are able to disperse these functions into geographically separated units in order to benefit from the attributes
specific to different locations (Helpman, 2006; Aarland et al., 2007). However, there must be powerful reasons for
business people to meet despite the high opportunity cost associated with travelling.
For multi-plant US firms Giroud (2013) shows that the opening of new airline links that reduce the travel time
between headquarters and plants has generated an increase of 7% in plants’ productivity. Charnoz et al. (2018)
use the development of the high-speed railway network in France to show how the decrease in passenger travel time
between headquarters and affiliates has allowed a higher concentration of management functions in headquarters. In
the same vein, Kalnins and Lafontaine (2013) observe that greater distance to headquarters is associated with shorter
establishment longevity. Whereas the media steadily stress the globalization of finance, the empirical evidence reveals
that a greater distance between lenders and borrowers tend to make loan contracts more restrictive (Hollander and
Verriest, 2016). Why is it so? The transmission of knowledge via the new communication devices remains incomplete
and imperfect (Leamer and Storper, 2001). In addition, face-to-face contacts are still needed between high-skilled
workers operating in spatially separated plants and headquarters because such contacts allow for immediate feedbacks
in non-routine activities (Battiston et al., 2017). The list could go on much further. Thus, despite the ICT revolution,
we may safely conclude that the communication curse is still with us.
Although the literature on multinational enterprises recognizes the existence of various types of spatial frictions,
it typically assumes that trade cost associated with the shipment of the manufactured good is sufficient to reflect the
impact of these frictions (Antràs and Yeaple, 2014). By establishing their plants in large markets, firms located in
small countries save trade costs. But then, they must bear communication costs between plants and headquarters.
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This points to the existence of a trade-off between these two types of spatial frictions. Therefore, the modeling
strategy that consists in merging these two spatial frictions under the heading of trade costs is unwarranted in the
study of multi-unit firms.
We consider the three main types of spatial organizational forms. A firm conducting all its activities under the
same roof opts for what we call a spatially integrated structure. When firms are not spatially integrated, we follow
the literature on FDIs and distinguish between the following two types of spatial organization (Caves, 1971). The
firm adopts a horizontal structure when several plants produce the same good at different locations. The cost of
being a horizontal firm is the loss in the returns to scale economies, while the benefit is direct access to each market
with zero trade costs. By contrast, the firm selects a vertical structure when it organizes and performs discrete
activities at distinct locations, which altogether form a supply chain. The vertical fragmentation of the firm aims
to take advantage of differences across locations, but this involves communication costs between headquarters and
plants, as well as trade costs from the foreign country to the domestic one. Thus, horizontal and vertical structures
should not be viewed as competitors.
To the best of our knowledge, no paper has addressed the occurrence of the three types of spatial organizational
forms in a trade setting involving firms established in different counties and competing in the same environment.
While knowledge spillovers are key in urban economics (Carlino and Kerr, 2014), the costs of transmitting information
and knowledge between headquarters and subsidiaries that are spatially separated are generally ignored in the trade
literature.1 This is where we hope to contribute by linking different strands of literature in a setting where firms are
free to choose their number and locations of plants in the presence of trade and communication costs. Somewhat
unexpectedly, we will see that horizontal and vertical firms may coexist under the same market and technological
conditions. In addition, our setting is general enough to interpret communication costs as a “reduced form” for the
various management and informational costs generated by spatial separation, such as those studied in the literature
on the organization of multi-level enterprises (Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009; Antràs and Yeaple, 2014). Thus,
very much like trade costs, communication costs may capture a wide range of effects.
What are our main findings? Assuming that firms are a priori identical, we show that the three organizational
forms may come together within the same country.2 Put differently, firms that are a priori homogeneous in pro-
ductivity choose to become heterogeneous in their spatial organization.3 For the coexistence of the three spatial
organizational forms to arise, the following conditions are required. First, communication costs cannot be too large,
for otherwise no firm chooses to be vertical. Second, trade costs cannot be too low, for otherwise all firms prefer to be
integrated. Last, fixed costs cannot be too high, for otherwise no firm would be horizontal, nor too low, for otherwise
all firms would avoid trade costs by being horizontal.
1Keller and Yeaple (2013) is a noticeable exception.
2 In Japan, integrated firms account for more than 75 percent of the manufacturing sector and vertical firms for 10 percent. The
remaining 15 percent are operated by horizontal firms. These shares remained very stable from 1992 to 2008. The census accounts for
firms with more than four full-time employees, which probably explains the high share of integrated firms. We thank Toshihiro Okubo
for these numbers.
3 In a market with two identical firms, Mills and Smith (1996) show that a firm may invest in a new technology that has a lower
marginal cost whereas its rival strategically chooses not to switch technology. Elberfeld (2003) extends this result to an oligopoly. This
author also shows that under monopolistic competition all firms make the same technological choice. Note that those results are obtained
in a closed and dimensionless economy.
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Furthermore, while the smaller country accommodates the three types of organizational forms, the larger country’s
firms remain integrated. Hence, there is one-way offshoring. For this, the trading partners must differ in size but
not too much. In this case, some of the smaller country’s firms invest abroad to have a better access to the larger
country, while other firms remain integrated and focus on the smaller country because the establishment of foreign
plants strengthens competition in the larger country. The same holds for most of the other equilibria: the larger
country’s firms are integrated while it pays for the smaller country’s firms to be different.
The coexistence of the three organizational forms is socially optimal under conditions similar to those that sustain
the market equilibrium. Nevertheless, since a firm’s production cost depends on its organizational choice, the cost
distribution is endogenous, which implies that the numbers of firms adopting a specific structure in the equilibrium
and optimal outcomes need not be the same, unlike the case where the cost distribution is exogenous (Dhingra and
Morrow, 2018). To be precise, we show that too few firms are horizontal while too many firms are vertical. All in
all, too few firms invest abroad.
We then study how trade and communication costs affect the pattern of organizational types. First, when shipping
goods becomes cheaper, the number of plants operating in each country decreases. Unlike what economic geography
tells us, a deeper integration makes competition softer in each country because firms change their organizational
form in response to a drop in trade costs (Baldwin et al., 2003). Our analysis confirms and extends a classical result
in the theory of multinational enterprises, that is, fewer firms go multinational (Markusen, 2002). More specifically,
lowering trade costs leads to a hike in the number of integrated firms, while reducing the number of horizontal firms
but raising the number of vertical firms.
Falling communication costs generate the opposite results as more firms go multinational. Even though the
total number of plants increases, the smaller country hosts fewer plants. In other words, lowering trade costs or
communication costs delivers contrasted spatial patterns of production: in the former more firms are integrated, while
more firms are fragmented in the latter. This should not come as a surprise since the two costs affect the proximity-
concentration trade-off differently: lowering trade costs weakens the need for proximity, while lower communication
costs weakens the benefits of concentration. In short, distance matters in different ways because distance means
different things under trade and communication costs. These results concur with Baldwin (2016) who argues that
drops in trade and communication costs are at the origin of two very different phases of globalization.4
When firms are a priori heterogeneous and differentiated by their own productivity, their incentives to choose a
particular organizational structure are affected, so that it is not clear that firms may want to be differentiated in
spatial organizational forms too. Therefore, we find it natural to investigate what our main findings become when
firms are a priori cost-heterogeneous. As in the foregoing, we show that the smaller country hosts the three types of
firms under conditions that are equivalent to those obtained when firms are homogeneous. The most efficient firms
4According to Baldwin (2016), the spatial organization of firms depend on three types of spatial frictions: the cost of moving goods,
the cost of moving ideas and the cost of moving people when face-to-face contacts are required. For our purpose, there is no need to
distinguish between the last two types of friction. It is, therefore, convenient to gather them under the heading of communication costs,
which encompass here the cost of moving codified information, which is easily sent by using the new information and communication
technologies, and tacit information, which often requires face-to-face contacts (Leamer and Storper, 2001). For our purpose, there is no
need either to distinguish between communication technology and information technology (Bloom et al., 2014). We refer to Baldwin for
more details.
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always choose to become horizontal because these firms are able to bear the higher fixed costs associated with the
operation of two plants. On the other hand, the organizational form selected by the least efficient firms depends on
the relative size of the two countries. When the asymmetry is strong, the medium efficient firms go vertical because
their home market is too small. Otherwise, they go integrated because their domestic market offers a sufficiently big
outlet. Last, we characterize and discuss the various spatial organizational forms that emerge in other equilibria.
Related literature. Our paper is obviously related to the huge literature on multinational enterprises (Markusen,
2002; Navaretti and Venables, 2004). The relationships with this literature will become clear as the paper develops.
Our model is even more connected to the meager literature on multi-plant firms (see Beckenstein, 1975, for an early
contribution). Following Markusen (1984), most of the contributions on multinational enterprises has focused on
the concentration-proximity trade-off. Behrens and Picard (2007) use an economic geography setting to compare
integrated and horizontal firms. These authors show that each country hosts both types of organizational forms
when fixed production costs take neither high nor low values. Using a setting where all firms are established in a core
region, Fujita and Thisse (2006) highlight the role of communication costs in firms’ decisions to go vertical. They
show that the core region may host both integrated and vertical firms. Fujita and Gokan (2005) extend this setting
to the case where firms may be horizontal or vertical. By contrast, we focus on competition among domestic and
foreign firms in the two countries, which leads to a richer set of results. For example, we show that the three types
of firms may coexist in equilibrium. In this respect, Yeaple (2003) is closer to us in that he studies the simultaneous
emergence of the three organizational forms. To do this, Yeaple considered a 3-country setting and shows that the
same firm may choose to go horizontal in one country and vertical in the other. In a multi-country setting, Head and
Mayer (2017) add two frictions, that is, headquarters services to the foreign affiliates and marketing costs between the
headquarters and the markets, to trade costs. Head and Mayer highlight the empirical relevance of the relationships
between headquarters and their foreign affiliates as a bilateral friction that comes on top of trade costs. In our
two-country setting, both headquarters services and marketing costs are collected under the heading of trade costs.
Our model also bears some resemblance with one of the workhorses of economic geography, that is, the footloose
capital model (Baldwin et al., 2003). In this model, firms run a single plant and are spatially integrated. By contrast,
we allow firms to choose their organizational forms, that is, headquarters and plants may or may not collocate, while
firms may operate one or several plants in each country. Therefore, our model can be viewed as the “footloose plant
model.” Finally, our setting is also related to the literature on the organization of firms with multiple layers (Antràs
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009). However, this literature focuses more on the micro underpinnings of the firm’s production
function and often ignores the product market feedback effects (see Chen, 2017, for a recent exception).
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the equilibrium and
welfare analyses when firms have the same productivity. The effects triggered by lower trade and communication
costs are studied in Section 4. In Section 5, we briefly discuss what the other equilibrium patterns are. Section 6
discusses what our main findings become when firms differ in productivity, while Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Model and Preliminary Results
2.1 The Economy
The economy features two countries - or any other spatial units such as regional trade blocks or subnational regions
(i = 1, 2) -, a manufacturing sector and a sector producing a homogeneous good, and two production factors -
skilled and unskilled labor. The mass of country i’s consumers is si > 0 with s1 > s2 and s1 + s2 = 1.
5 The
manufacturing sector supplies a differentiated good, which is produced under increasing returns and monopolistic
competition using skilled and unskilled workers. Each variety is provided by a single firm and each firm supplies a
single variety. The homogeneous good is produced under constant returns and perfect competition by using unskilled
workers only. This good is costlessly traded, so that its price is the same in both countries. We choose it as the
numéraire. Each consumer is endowed with one unit of skilled or unskilled labor, which is supplied inelastically. To
rule out comparative advantage à la Heckscher-Ohlin, the share ϕ ∈ (0, 1) of skilled workers is the same in both
countries. Like in trade theory, both skilled and unskilled workers are spatially immobile.
A firm involves a headquarters (HQ) and one or two production plants. By convention, we refer to a firm’s
location as the location of its HQ. To operate, a HQ needs a given number of skilled workers only. A HQ provides the
specialized pre- and post-fabrication services for the good to be processed and delivered to customers. For notational
simplicity, we assume that a HQ needs ϕ units of skilled labor. Since the total supply of skilled labor is equal to ϕ,
market clearing implies that the total mass of firms and varieties is equal to 1. By implication, country i hosts si firms.
Unskilled labor is used in plants to produce the differentiated good. Each firm chooses to have a single production
facility in one of the two countries or a production site in each country where the same variety is produced. Hence,
the mass of plants is endogenous. More precisely, the total mass of plants varies from 1 to 2. The skilled’s earnings
are given by a firm’s profits divided by the number of skilled working in the HQ.
Our main objective is to insulate the effects of two different spatial frictions on firms’ organizational forms through
the number and location of plants they operate. To achieve our goal, we consider two countries which share similar
levels of economic and technological development. This does not strike us as an unrealistic context to investigate.
Indeed, even though the peak of FDI inflows in OECD countries was reached in 2007 with 70% of all FDI inflows,
these investments still account for 40% in 2015 (OECD, 2016). Another example is provided by two large regional
economies of the same country, which are likely to share many common social and technological features.
More specifically, we assume that the wage of the unskilled is the same in both countries. This condition holds
when the numéraire is costlessly traded. Furthermore, plants’ productivity is the same in both countries, which
implies that international productivity difference is not the reason for the geographical fragmentation of firms. In
our setting the choice of different spatial organizational forms hinges on the interplay between trade, communication
and fixed production costs. The gains from being integrated stem from saving communication costs, while the gains
from being separated stem from saving transport costs by producing in the larger market.
5This normalization entails no loss of generality since the fixed labor requirement associated with the launching of a plant is an inverse
measure of the size of the economy.
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2.2 Consumers
Consumers share the same quasi-linear preferences given by
U = ln
 1
0
x
σ−1
σ
k dk
 σ
σ−1

+ z,
where xk is the consumption of variety k ∈ [0, 1], σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, while
z stands for the consumption of the composite good. A consumer’s budget constraint on the differentiated good is
thus given by  1
0
xkpkdk = 1, (1)
where pk is the consumer price of variety k. By implication, an increase in income generates the same increase in the
consumption of the composite good. Therefore, the manufacturing sector operates as in a CES one-sector economy.
Since total profits are zero, most of the trade and economic geography literature focuses on a Cobb-Douglas upper-
tier utility. Using such preferences makes our model especially hard to handle because skilled workers’ incomes are
endogenous and unequal across countries. As a result, the demand for a particular variety changes with consumers’
incomes, which depend themselves on the overall demand system. Using quasi-linear preferences allows us to obviate
this difficulty because the individual expenditure on the differentiated good is exogenous and equal between countries.
Note that many, but not all, trade or economic geography models assumed that the homogeneous good is costlessly
traded so that incomes are exogenous and the same in both countries. In this case, the individual expenditure on
the manufactured good is also exogenous and the same in the two countries, like in (1). A noticeable exception is
the footloose capital model with one sector in which individual expenditures are endogenous and different across
countries (see, e.g., Takahashi et al., 2013, for a complete solution of this problem).
It is well known that the individual demand for variety k is given by
xk =
p−σk
∆
, (2)
where pk is the consumer price of variety k while the market aggregate
∆ ≡
 1
0
p
−(σ−1)
k dk = P
−(σ−1) (3)
is a monotone decreasing transformation of the CES-price index
P =
 1
0
p
−(σ−1)
k dk
−1/(σ−1)
.
2.3 Producers
Firms are heterogeneous. More specifically, to operate a plant, a θ-firm needs a fixed requirement of f > 0 and a
marginal requirement of c/θ units of unskilled labor where θ ∈ [1, θ) is drawn from the cumulative distribution G(θ).
In line with the literature, we assume that G is given by a truncated Pareto distribution G(θ) = α · [1 − (1/θ)κ]
where α ≡ θ
κ
/(θ
κ
− 1) > 1, while κ > 2 guarantees that the productivity distribution has a finite variance. A higher
value of κ means a smaller variance in firms’ heterogeneity. When firms are homogeneous (κ → ∞), the marginal
requirement of unskilled labor is the same across firms and equal to c.
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In our model, the “distance” between countries is measured in two different ways. First, in line with the literature,
when a firm ships one unit of its variety abroad it incurs an iceberg trade cost τ > 1; it is costless to ship the variety
to its local customers. Second, a firm’s HQ provides various specialized inputs to its plant(s), while local managers
require regularly pieces of information from their HQs related to specific tasks, unexpected issues, and more. This
implies the existence of communication costs between the two units. Since distance affects productivity in a negative
way, it is natural to assume that the plant’s marginal cost is higher when the HQ and plant are located in different
countries. In what follows, we also model communication costs as an iceberg cost γ > 1, while γ = 1 when plants and
HQs are collocated. Our modeling strategy of communication costs may also be justified on the following grounds.
First, using an iceberg cost implies that communication costs are proportional to the plant output. This is
in line with the literature on firms’ organization where managers spend time solving sophisticated tasks arising,
e.g., in distant plants while their working time is proportional to firms’ output (Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994;
Garicano, 2000; Gumpert, 2018). Second, since γ > 1 can take any arbitrary value our approach is consistent with
communication costs that are unrelated to distance, as in the case of talks via communication devices or discriminatory
trade policies (e.g., visa restrictions) and costs that vary with distance, as in the case of travel costs of business people.
Third, since less efficient firms are likely to experience higher communication costs, the marginal cost of a c-firm
may be expressed as γc/θ when the plant is located in the foreign country. For example, a lower quality of internal
resources makes firms more vulnerable when HQs and plants are spatially separated. Last, modeling both frictions
in the same way makes it easier to compare their respective impact on firms’ organizational forms.6
The choice of a specific organizational form affects a firm’s production cost.7 In what follows, we describe the
cost functions associated with the three types of firms. We denote by qij the total consumption in country j = 1, 2
of a variety produced in country i = 1, 2.
(i) A θ-firm is said to be integrated (I) when it operates a single plant which is located together with its HQ; the
plant supplies both markets. Hence, the cost function of a I-firm with productivity θ located in country i = 1, 2 is
given by
Cni (θ) = f +
c
θ
· (qii + τqij) with j = i. (4)
The total output, or size, of this firm is thus equal to qni ≡ qii + τqij .
(ii) A θ-firm is vertical (V) when it has a single plant, which operates abroad; the plant supplies both countries.
A V-firm faces an additional cost associated with the operation of a plant set up away from its HQ. As discussed
in the introduction, distance implies higher coordination and communication costs between the HQ and its plant.
Therefore, the cost function of a V-firm located in country i is given by
Cvi (θ) = f +
c
θ
· (τγqii + γqij) with j = i. (5)
This firm’s total output is given by qvi ≡ τγqii + γqij .
(iii) Finally, a θ-firm is horizontal (H) when it has a plant in each country. When a firm splits its production
between the two countries, it incurs an additional fixed cost f . Since the plant located abroad incurs communication
costs γ to use the services supplied by its HQ, the marginal costs are, respectively, c/θ and γc/θ. Since both plants
6Duranton and Puga (2005) and Fujita and Thisse (2006) adopt the same modeling approach in different settings.
7 In this respect, we differ from Melitz (2003) since the marginal costs change with the firms’ organizational choices.
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supply the same variety, the activity of a H-firm entails no trade between countries. The cost function of a H-firm
located in country i is then given by the following expression:
Chi (θ) = 2f +
c
θ
· (qii + γqij) with j = i, (6)
while its total output is equal to qhi ≡ qii + γqij .
Note that communication costs differ from a productivity differential between countries. Indeed, communication
costs arise when a firm’s HQ and its plant are spatially separated regardless of the country hosting the plant. By
contrast, the plant of any type of firm produces at a lower cost only when it is located in the high productivity
country.
The expressions (4)—(6) show that trade and communication costs affect firms’ production costs in different ways
according to their organizational form.8
2.4 Market Equilibrium
Since all country i-firms sharing the same productivity θ and the same organizational form k = n, v, h choose the
same equilibrium consumer price pkii(θ) in country i (p
k
ij(θ) in country j), (2) implies that the profit function of a
θ-firm is given by the following expression:
πki (θ) = si ·
(pkii(θ))
1−σ
∆i
+ sj ·
(pkij(θ))
1−σ
∆j
−Cki (θ) with k = n, v, h, i, j = 1, 2 and j = i.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, firms choose their organizational forms and, then, their prices and
quantities sold in each country.
For notational simplicity, we choose the unit of output for c = (σ−1)/σ < 1 to hold. Using (2), profit-maximization
yields the equilibrium consumer price of a variety produced in country i = 1, 2 by a I-firm and sold in countries i
and j:
pnii(θ) =
1
θ
pnij(θ) =
τ
θ
> pnii with j = i. (7)
A V-firm located in country i charges prices equal to
pvii(θ) =
γτ
θ
> pnii(θ) p
v
ij(θ) =
γ
θ
< pvii(θ) with j = i, (8)
while a H-firm in i sets prices given by
phii(θ) =
1
θ
phij(θ) =
γ
θ
> phii(θ) with j = i. (9)
In this case, we have the following ranking of consumer prices:
pnii(θ) = p
h
ii(θ) < p
v
ij(θ) = p
h
ij(θ) < p
n
ij(θ) < p
v
ii(θ).
In equilibrium, firms sharing the same productivity choose the same organizational form. Then, we denote by Ni
(or Vi or Hi) the set of firms in country i, which are integrated (or vertical or horizontal). Using (7)—(9), the market
8Note that the communication cost γ in (5) cannot be interpreted as a wage wedge between the two countries. Indeed, this interpretation
would mean that producing in i is more expensive than in j. However, as Cvi and C
v
j have the same functional form, this would imply
that producing in i would be cheaper than in j, a contradiction.
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aggregate ∆i is given by the following expression:
∆i = A · (ni + njφ+ viφω + vjω + hi + hjω) ,
where 0 < φ ≡ τ−(σ−1) < 1 and 0 < ω ≡ γ−(σ−1) < 1 whose values measure, respectively, the freeness of trade and
the freeness of communication, while
ni ≡
si
A

Ni
θσ−1dG vi ≡
si
A

Vi
θσ−1dG hi ≡
si
A

Hi
θσ−1dG, (10)
and
A ≡
κ
κ− σ + 1
·

θ
	κ
−

θ
	σ−1
θ
	κ
− 1
> 0. (11)
The constant A is a normalization parameter which guarantees that si + sj = 1; it converges to 1 when firms are
homogeneous (κ→∞).
Computing the above integrals and summing yields
ni + vi + hi = si, (12)
It follows from (12) that ni (or vi or hi) is the actual mass of integrated (or vertical or horizontal) firms in country
i. Consequently, ∆i can be interpreted as the effective mass of plants competing in country i, that is, the mass of
plants discounted by the corresponding friction factors φ and ω. Indeed, everything works as if the mass of plants
located in country i were equal to ∆i. As ∆i rises through lower trade or communication costs, the price index Pi
decreases because the effective mass of plants is higher. In other words, when the organizational structure of firms is
given, lower communication and/or trade costs render both markets more competitive. On the contrary, when trade
and communication costs are prohibitively high (φ = ω = 0), ∆i = si. When there is no spatial friction (φ = ω = 1),
∆i = 1, which means that all plants compete symmetrically in each country regardless of their locations. Note also
that the price index in country i depends on the spatial structure chosen by firms located in both countries.
Using (12), we can rewrite ∆i as follows:
∆i = A · [si + ωsj − (ω − φ)nj − (1− φω)vi] , i = 1, 2. (13)
Measuring the intensity of competition in a market by the inverse of the corresponding price index, we may
conclude as follows. If all country i-firms are integrated (ni = si), competition becomes tougher in i and softer in
country j because all i-firms produce home, which protects j-firms. If all firms are vertical (vi = si), competition
becomes tougher in country j, and softer in country i because all varieties are imported from j. Last, if all i-firms are
horizontal (hi = si), competition gets tougher in both countries because each country hosts a larger mass of plants.
In short, the organizational structure of firms affects the intensity of competition in both countries.
Using (2) and (7)—(9), the profits made by a I-firm, aV-firm and aH-firm are, respectively, given by the following
expressions:
πni (θ) =
θσ−1
σ

si
∆i
+ φ
sj
∆j

− f, (14)
πvi (θ) =
θσ−1
σ

φω
si
∆i
+ ω
sj
∆j

− f, (15)
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πhi (θ) =
θσ−1
σ

si
∆i
+ ω
sj
∆j

− 2f. (16)
An equilibrium is such that consumer maximizes utility, each firm maximizes its profits, markets clear, and profits
are positive in both countries. Since firms are free to choose the organizational form across space, the equilibrium
profits in country i = 1, 2 are such that
π∗i (θ) = max{π
n
i (θ), π
v
i (θ), π
h
i (θ)} > 0.
The following remarks are in order. First, I-firms’ profits decrease with communication costs because the price
indices P1 and P2 fall, while H-firms’ profits fall for the same reason when trade costs decrease. Profits of V-firms
change with φ and ω in more complex ways. Note already the importance of communication costs for the difference
between integrated and multinational firms. If communication costs are prohibitive (ω = 0), all firms are integrated.
Second, when communication costs are negligible (ω = 1), the model has a continuum of equilibrium distributions
of organizational types (see Appendix 1). This is reminiscent of Krugman (1980) where there is a continuum of firm
distributions when φ = 1. In order to eliminate such extreme cases, we assume that 0 < ω < 1. If φ = ω = 1, no firm
seeks to become horizontal while integrated and vertical firms face the same profit function and, therefore, remain
identical. More generally, when identical firms that face the option of investing in new technologies to produce at a
lower marginal cost, they all choose to invest or not to invest, which implies that they are always identical (Elberfeld,
2003).
Third, a straightforward comparison of (14) and (15) implies that πni (θ) > π
v
i (θ) when communication costs are
higher than trade costs (ω < φ). In other words, when communication costs are high, no firm is vertical. Similarly,
if trade costs are very low (φ ≈ 1), (14) and (16) imply that πni (θ) > π
h
i (θ) when sj > si. Put differently, when trade
costs are low, no firm is horizontal. Since our focus is on the coexistence of the three organizational forms within the
same country, we assume from now on that
0 < φ < ω < 1
holds. This describes well the on-going situation because the recent drop in communication costs associated with the
rapid development of ICTs has been sharp, while the supply of high-speed railway and airline links has drastically
expanded. Trade costs also came down, but at a slower pace.
In this case, (13) becomes easy to interpret. The term si+ωsj in the right hand-side of (13) is the effective mass
of plants in country i when all domestic firms are integrated or horizontal. When some foreign firms choose to be
integrated, the price of their varieties is affected by the gap ω − φ > 0 between communication and trade costs.
Similarly, the term (1−φω)vi accounts for the i-firm that choose to go vertical, which generates a price gap equal to
1− φω. Since communication costs are lower than trade costs, everything else equal this renders market in country
i more competitive because more j-firms locate their plants in country i.
Last, it follows from (14) and (15) that sj/∆j > si/∆i must hold for some i-firms to go vertical. Since sj/∆j <
si/∆i must also hold for some j-firms to be vertical, V-firms can exist at most in one country.
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3 Homogeneous Firms
Although we recognize that firms are differentiated by their productivity in the real world, working with heterogeneous
firms would blur the sheer effects that drive firms in their organizational choices in the space-economy. This is why
we start with the case of homogeneous firms. In other words, we assume that κ → ∞, so that θ and A converge
to 1. A comprehensive analysis of all possible patterns would be very burdensome. Rather, we focus on the telling
example in which the three types of organizational forms emerge in equilibrium. We define a mixed equilibrium as an
equilibrium outcome in which at least one country hosts the three types of firms. SinceV-firms cannot coexist in both
countries, only one country, say j, can accommodate the three organizational forms. In this case, the equilibrium
condition in country j is as follows:
πnj = π
v
j = π
h
j > 0. (17)
More specifically, we determine necessary and sufficient conditions for homogeneous firms located in country j,
to become heterogeneous in the way they organize their production activities between countries, which shows that
competition alone is sufficient for identical firms to operate under the three organizational forms.
As shown in Appendix 1, at any mixed equilibrium one country, say i, hosts only integrated firms (ni = si). In
what follows, we find the mass of j-firms which choose each organizational form and show that i = 1 and j = 2,
meaning that diversification arises among the smaller country’s firms. Furthermore, we determine the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the candidate mixed equilibrium to exist.
3.1 Organizational Forms
When ni = si, we may use (17) to determine the corresponding equilibrium values of ∆i and ∆j .
1. Using (14) and (16), the condition πhj = π
n
j implies
∆∗i =
ω − φ
σf
si. (18)
Observe that (3) and (18) imply that P ∗i decreases with the size of country i. Similarly, P
∗
i decreases when σ and/or
f falls because more plants settle in country i when varieties are less differentiated and/or fixed costs are lower.
2. Using (15) and (16), the condition πhj = π
v
j implies
∆∗j =
1− φω
σf
sj . (19)
For the three firm-types to coexist in a country, the national indices ∆∗i and ∆
∗
j must be given by (18) and (19).
3. The last condition πni = π
v
i yields
∆∗i
∆∗j
=
si
sj
·
ω − φ
1− φω
, (20)
which follows immediately from (18) and (19). The expression (20) highlights how communication and trade costs
interact in j-firms’ spatial choices through the price indices of the two markets. Furthermore, if ω = 1, that is, there
are no communication costs, (20) becomes
∆∗i
∆∗j
=
si
sj
,
which is identical to the equilibrium condition obtained by Helpman et al. (2004) and Baldwin and Forslid (2010)
when firms have the same productivity. In this case, the price index ratio is determined by the relative size of
countries.
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3.2 Mixed Equilibrium
We now study the configuration where all firms located in the larger country are integrated (n∗1 = s1), while the
smaller country accommodates integrated, vertical and horizontal firms.
Denote by S ≡ s2/s1 the relative size of the two countries, with S ∈ (0, 1). We show in Appendix 2 that profits
are equal across types when the 2-firms are split into the following three groups:
n∗2 =
1
1 + S
·

1 + ωS
ω − φ
−
1
σf

, (21)
v∗2 =
1
1 + S
·

φ+ S
1− φω
−
S
σf

, (22)
h∗2 =
1
1 + S
·

1 + S
σf
−
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS)
(1− φω)(ω − φ)

. (23)
But does a mixed equilibrium exist and is it unique? Inspecting n∗2 and v
∗
2 shows immediately that σf must be
bounded below for n∗2 and v
∗
2 to be positive. Otherwise competition is too soft, or fixed costs are too low, to prevent
all 2-firms to be horizontal. Likewise, it follows from h∗2 that σf must be bounded above from h
∗
2 to be positive.
Otherwise competition is too tough, or fixed costs are too high, for some 2-firms to be able to cover the fixed cost
associated with the launching of a second plant. In short, varieties cannot be very poor or very close substitutes,
fixed costs cannot be very small or very large, or both.
Using (21)-(23) yields necessary and sufficient conditions for n∗2 > 0, v
∗
2 > 0, and h
∗
2 > 0 to hold. Putting these
conditions together shows that country 2 hosts the three types of organizational forms if and only if the following
condition holds:
BL < σf < BR, (24)
where BL and BR are bundles of the parameters S, ω, and φ defined as follows:
BL ≡ max


ω − φ
1 + ωS
,
(1− φω)S
φ+ S

, BR ≡
(ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS)
.
Furthermore, for (24) to be feasible, BR must exceed BL. We show in Appendix 2 that there exists a unique
value S such that BL < BR if and only if the size ratio S satisfies the following inequalities:
φ
K
< S < S <
1
K
, (25)
where
K ≡
1− ωφ
ω − φ
> 1.
Since S must be smaller than 1 for (24) to be satisfied, Appendix 1 implies that country 1 hosts only I-firms.
Finally, it can be shown that the equilibrium (21)-(23) is unique under (24) and (25).9
To sum up, we have:
Proposition 1. Assume that 0 < φ < ω < 1. Then, there exists a mixed equilibrium if and only if (24) and (25)
hold. This equilibrium is unique and given by n∗1 = s1 and (21)-(23).
Without productivity differences across firms and international wage differences, the 2-firms are at a disadvantage
in accessing the larger market. It is, therefore, no surprise that some of these firms choose to invest in country 1. What
9This is done by showing that some configurations are never an equilibrium while the remaining configurations are not an equilibrium
under (24)-(25). Details can be found in the Supplementary Material, which is available from the authors upon request.
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is less straight forward is that the three organizational forms coexist even when there is no exogenous heterogeneity
across firms and countries but their relative size.10
Yet, the intuition behind Proposition 1 is easy to grasp. Since the 1-firms have a direct access to the larger market,
they are not incited to differentiate their spatial structures. In other words, the larger country has no V-firms and
H-firms. By contrast, the smaller country accommodates both V-firms and H-firms in order to have a better access
to the larger market. However, for this to happen, the mass of plants established in country 1 cannot be too large
relative to the size of this country. Moreover, since the 1-firms always choose to be integrated while (21)-(23) is
the unique equilibrium configuration that prevails in country 2 under (24) and (25), the equilibrium described in
Proposition 1 is the unique mixed equilibrium.
Furthermore, what matters for a mixed equilibrium to arise is the relative size S of the two countries. If they have
similar sizes, the 2-firms have a strong incentive to focus on their domestic market, making V-firms unprofitable. By
contrast, owing to the fixed cost they have to bear, these firms have little incentive to invest home when country 2 is
not big enough, making H-firms unprofitable. As a result, the size of country 1 must take on intermediate values for
a mixed configuration to arise in equilibrium. In the same vein, the fixed cost associated with the construction of a
second plant cannot be very low, for otherwise all the 2-firms would undertake horizontal investments, neither very
large, for otherwise no 2-firms would undertake such investments. This is precisely what (24) says. In addition, fixed
production costs relative to country sizes cannot be too different for horizontal firms to emerge, while they cannot be
similar either, for otherwise no firm would be integrated. In short, full diversification requires trade between countries
which differ in size but not too much.
In addition, we can use the demand (2) and the equilibrium prices (7)—(9) to find the equilibrium size of 1-firms
and the different types of 2-firms:
qn1 =

φ
1− φω
+
1
ω − φ

σf,
qn2 =

1
1− φω
+
φ
ω − φ

σf = qv2 =

φω
1− φω
+
ω
ω − φ

σf < qh2 =

1
1− φω
+
ω
ω − φ

σf. (26)
Hence, the I- and V-firms have the same size, which is smaller than that of the H-firms. However, the I-
and V-firms sell different quantities in each country because they set different consumer prices. Moreover, the
integrated 1-firms are bigger than the integrated 2-firms. This is because the market size effect (s1 > s2) dominates
the competition effect triggered by the higher mass of plants located in country 1.
Finally, the equilibrium profits are given by
π∗1 = π
n
1 =

1
ω − φ
+
φ
1− φω
− 1

f,
π∗2 = π
n
2 = π
v
2 = π
h
2 =

1
1− φω
+
φ
ω − φ
− 1

f. (27)
We have π∗1 > π
∗
2 > 0, where the second inequality holds because ω > φ. In other words, the skilled workers
earn more in the larger country than in the smaller one. This agrees with the empirical literature that stresses the
existence of a robust relationship between the wage of (skilled) workers and market size (Redding, 2011).
10When (24)-(25) do not hold, the market equilibrium typically involves partial diversification. See Section 5 for further discussion.
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3.3 Welfare
Does the multiplicity of spatial organizations entail a waste of resources? The benefit of using quasi-linear preferences
are reap in the welfare analysis because we have four groups of individuals, that is, the skilled and unskilled workers
in countries 1 and 2, whose utilities can be added. More specifically, the planner chooses the consumption level of
each variety and the mass of firm-types in each country so as to maximize the sum of individual utilities net of all
costs:
W ≡
2
i=1
siUi −
2
i=1

niC
n
i + viC
v
i + hiC
h
i
	
(28)
subject to (12), where we have set:
Ui ≡
σ
σ − 1
ln

ni(x
n
ii)
σ−1
σ + vi(x
v
ii)
σ−1
σ + hi(x
hi
ii )
σ−1
σ + nj(x
n
ji)
σ−1
σ + vj(x
v
ji)
σ−1
σ + hj(x
hj
ii )
σ−1
σ

+ z,
while the cost functions are given by (4)-(6) where qij = sjxij . Varieties are priced at marginal cost at the first best
outcome.
The next proposition is proven in Appendix 3.
Proposition 2. Assume that 0 < φ < ω < 1. If
BL < (σ − 1)f < BR, (29)
then the social optimum is such that all firms in the larger country are integrated, while the smaller country hosts
the three types of organizational forms:
n∗2 > n
o
2 =
1
1 + S
·

1 + ωS
ω − φ
−
1
f(σ − 1)

(30)
v∗2 > v
o
2 =
1
1 + S
·

φ+ S
1− φω
−
S
f(σ − 1)

, (31)
h∗2 < h
o
2 =
1
1 + S
·

1 + S
f(σ − 1)
−
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS)
(ω − φ)(1− φω)

. (32)
Following the same approach as in 3.2, it is readily verified that no2 > 0, v
o
2 > 0 and h
o
2 > 0 if and only if (29)
holds. Here too, communication costs must be lower than trade costs (ω > φ) for this condition to be satisfied.
Under CES preferences, the equilibrium and optimum of a one-sector economy coincide even when firms are
heterogeneous (Dhingra and Morrow, 2018). Therefore, it is no surprise that the coexistence of different organizational
forms is not socially wasteful. Indeed, comparing (24) and (29) shows that both the market equilibrium and the
social optimum involve the coexistence of all organizational forms when BL/(σ − 1) < f < BR/σ. However, the
numbers of firm-types in the smaller country need not be the same at the two outcomes because the cost distribution
is now endogenous through the organizational choices made by firms.
Propositions 1 and 2 have the following implication: the social optimum involves fewer integrated and vertical firms
and more horizontal firms than the market equilibrium. Since n∗2 > n
o
2, too few country 2-firms become multinational
when firms compete. Indeed, the 2-firms hold back their investments in the larger market to soften competition
therein. As a result, competition in the larger country becomes weak enough for this market to host too many V-
firms. This in turn implies that too many 2-firms do not invest in their home country by delocalizing their production
activities in the larger country. Hence, each country accommodates too few plants at the market outcome. To put it
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differently, there is an excessive geographical concentration of production. Note also that Proposition 2 shows that
the diversity of organizational forms allows minimizing the total trade and communication costs associated with the
first-best flows of varieties.
4 Market Size and Spatial Frictions
In this section, we study the effects of market size, trade and communication costs on the mass of plants and the
numbers of each firm-type. In particular, we will see that trade and communication costs have very different impacts
on the market outcome and its welfare properties.
4.1 The Home Market Effect
Our set-up allows us to determine the total mass of plants in the whole economy and their distribution between
the two countries. In this section, we show how these masses vary with the absolute and relative sizes of the two
countries.
First of all, Proposition 1 implies that the mass of plants located in the larger country is equal to s1+v
∗
2+h
∗
2 > s1,
while the mass of plants established in the smaller country is n∗2+h
∗
2 = s2−v
∗
2 < s2. Consequently, the larger country
hosts a disproportionately higher mass of plants. This result echoes the home market effect (HME), which states
that the larger country hosts a more than proportionate share of firms, which are by assumption spatially integrated
(Baldwin et al., 2003).
We now study the impact of the relative size of the two countries on the mass of plants located in country 1 by
differentiating n∗1 + v
∗
2 + h
∗
2 with respect to S = s2/s1. First, we have:
dn∗1
dS
= −
1
(1 + S)2
. (33)
Second, some tedious calculations show that the following expression holds:
dv∗2
dS
+
dh∗2
dS
=
1
(1 + S)2

1− φ
ω − φ
−
1
σf

. (34)
By implication of (24), we have
σf < BR =
(ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS)
<
ω − φ
1− φ
⇔
1− φ
ω − φ
−
1
σf
< 0,
because (1 + S)/(1 + ωS) is an increasing function of S while the inequality holds at S = 1/K. Therefore, we have:
dv∗2
dS
+
dh∗2
dS
< 0. (35)
Combining (33) and (34) yields
d(n∗1 + v
∗
2 + h
∗
2)
dS
=
1
(1 + S)2

1− φ
ω − φ
−
1
σf
− 1

< −1.
Since an increase in s1 amounts to a decrease in S, the share of plants located in the larger country grows
disproportionately with the size of this country. More specifically, a relatively higher number of workers in country 1
triggers an even stronger flow of foreign investments through a higher mass of V-firms. This corresponds to a drop
in the mass of I-firms established in the smaller country.
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Furthermore, we have:
d(n∗2 + h
∗
2)
dS
=
1
(1 + S)2

φ(1− ω)
1− φω
+
1
σf

> 0.
Combining this expression with (35) implies
d(v∗2 + h
∗
2)
dS
= −
dn∗2
dS
< 0 <
d(n∗2 + h
∗
2)
dS
.
Hence, when the relative size of the smaller country decreases, it hosts fewer integrated firms. Moreover, the
mass of country 2’s H-firms decreases, but this drop is more than compensated by the hike in the mass of V-firms
generated by the larger size of country 1. In other words, country 1 hosts more foreign plants.
Finally, since
d(n∗1 + v
∗
2 + h
∗
2)
dS
+
d(n∗2 + h
∗
2)
dS
=
1
(1 + S)2
(1− ω)(1− φ2)
(ω − φ)(1− φω)
> 0,
the increase in the mass of country 1’s plants is smaller than the decrease in the mass of plants operating in country
2. By implication, the total mass of plants in the economy falls when countries become more dissimilar in size.
The following proposition comprises a summary.
Proposition 3. Assume that 0 < φ < ω < 1. At a mixed equilibrium, the larger country hosts a more
than proportionate share of plants. Furthermore, the mass of plants established in this country increases more than
proportionally with its size, while the total mass of plants operating in the economy decreases.
This proposition suggests the gradual hollowing out of the smaller country as its relative size shrinks.
4.2 Trade Costs
The most popular thought experiment in the literature deals with the impact of trade costs on firms’ locational
decisions. Using (18) and (19) where i = 1 and j = 2 shows that both ∆∗1 and ∆
∗
2 decrease when φ rises. In
other words, lowering trade costs is associated with a smaller effective mass of plants on each market. Therefore,
competition is softened in each country, as reflected by a higher price index in each country (P ∗1 and P
∗
2 increase).
To shed more light on the various effects at work, we differentiate n∗2, v
∗
2 and h
∗
2:
0 <
dv∗2
dφ
<
dn∗2
dφ
< −
dh∗2
dφ
.
Hence, fewer firms go multinational when market integration becomes deeper, so that the mass of I-firms rises.
However, the impact on H- and V-firms are opposite. While a decrease in trade costs leads to a smaller mass of
H-firms since the access to country 1 becomes easier from country 2, the mass of V-firms rises because reimporting
goods from country 1 to the country 2 is cheaper. In addition, when trade costs fall, both markets become less
competitive (∆∗1 and ∆
∗
2 decrease, hence P
∗
1 and P
∗
2 increase). Since more 2-firms become vertical, fewer 2-firms
invest home, which renders market 2 less competitive. Similarly, market 1 becomes less competitive since the drop
in the mass of H-firms is stronger than the hike in the mass of V-firms.
Furthermore, it is well known that a deeper market integration induces the relocation of firms from the smaller
to the larger country when firms are spatially integrated and mobile (Baldwin et al., 2003). Here, the total mass of
plants operating in the larger country decreases faster than in smaller country when trade costs fall. In other words,
17
a deeper market integration makes the HME weaker rather than stronger. However, the result that production is
concentrated in a smaller mass of plants when trade costs decrease concurs with the main message of economic
geography, that is, lowering trade costs fosters the agglomeration of activities. This shows that the phenomenon of
agglomeration may take different concrete forms.
4.3 Communication Costs
It follows immediately from (18) and (19) that lowering communication costs have a different impact on the two
markets. Indeed, as ω increases, the effective mass of plants competing in the larger country rises, whereas the
effective mass of plants competing in the smaller country falls. Consequently, competition is intensified in country 1
and weakened in country 2.
More specifically, since making the transfer of information cheaper facilitates the spatial fragmentation of firms,
it is readily verified that
dn∗2
dω
< 0
dv∗2
dω
> 0
dh∗2
dω
> 0.
In other words, lowering communication costs leads more 2-firms to go multinational, which increases the mass of
plants hosted by the larger market, while the mass of plants established in the smaller country decreases. Observe the
difference with the impact of lower trade costs which lead to a drop in the mass of multinational firms. Furthermore,
whereas lower trade costs weakens the HME, the total mass of plants located in the larger country increases with ω,
hence there is magnification of the HME. That is to say, communication costs play here the same role as trade costs
in the footloose capital model (Baldwin et al., 2003). Since country 2 hosts fewer firms, decreasing communication
costs also triggers the hollowing out of the smaller country through the relocation of manual jobs toward the larger
country.
How does the size of each type of firm reacts a drop in trade and communication costs? Differentiating (26) with
respect φ and ω yields the following inequalities:
∂qn1
∂φ
>
∂qn2
∂φ
=
∂qv2
∂φ
=
∂qh2
∂φ
=

ω
(1− φω)2
+
ω
(ω − φ)2

σf > 0,
∂qn1
∂ω
<
∂qn2
∂ω
=
∂qv2
∂ω
=
∂qh2
∂ω
=

φ
(1− φω)2
−
φ
(ω − φ)2

σf < 0.
Therefore, trade liberalization makes all firms bigger, regardless of their type and location, while the ICT revo-
lution generates the reverse. Again, trade and communication costs have opposite effects.
Finally, the diverging impact of trade and communication costs may also be illustrated by studying how these
costs affect firms’ profits. First, since market integration leads to fewer plants in each country, competition is relaxed
in both countries, which leads firms to make higher profits. Indeed, differentiating the equilibrium profits (27) with
respect to φ yields:
dπ∗2
dφ
= ω
dπ∗1
dφ
> 0.
Therefore, a deeper market integration allows all the skilled to earn higher incomes in both countries. However,
the income divergence is exacerbated as the two countries become more integrated.
Second, differentiating (27) with respect to ω, it is readily verified that
dπ∗1
dω
<
dπ∗2
dω
< 0.
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Since the 1-firms are integrated, they do not benefit from the drop in communication costs while facing a higher
mass of foreign competitors on their domestic market. Consequently, the 1-firms and the 2-vertical and horizontal
firms make lower profits in the larger market. Although the smaller market is less competitive because fewer 2-firms
invest home, the difference in market sizes is sufficiently big (s1 > s¯ > s2) for the losses incurred in country 1 to
overcome the gains made in country 2. Consequently, in both countries the skilled end up with lower incomes when
communication costs fall. Moreover, the income gap shrinks when communication costs fall.
The main predictions of our model are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Assume that 0 < φ < ω < 1. At a mixed equilibrium, lowering trade costs makes all firms bigger
and leads to a smaller mass of plants, while lower communication costs have the opposite impact. Furthermore, trade
liberalization raises profits while the adoption of new ICTs yields lower profits.
Hence, as suggested by several empirical studies, exports and FDI are indeed substitutes (Head and Ries, 2003).
Note also that Propositions 1, 2 and 4 imply that the optimal and equilibrium masses of firms respond in the same
way to shocks on trade or communication costs.
5 What Are the Other Equilibrium Patterns of Organization?
When (24) and/or (25) do not hold, the market outcome differs from (21)-(23). The following result extends the
existence and uniqueness result of Proposition 1 (see the Supplemental Material for a proof).11 The properties of
the equilibrium are discussed further down.
Proposition 5. Assume that 0 < φ < ω < 1. Then, there exists a unique organizational equilibrium almost
everywhere in X = {(S, σf) | 0 < S < 1, 0 < σf}.
One of the main thought experiments in the economics of multinational enterprises is to study how firms’ orga-
nizational forms vary with the level of fixed costs and the relative size of markets (Markusen, 2002). In other words,
we want to determine the market outcome when the value of σf does not belong to the interval (24). In what follows,
we briefly describe the various equilibria and refer the reader to the Supplemental Material for more details. To
achieve our goal, we assume that σf steadily decreases from very high to very low values or, equivalently, the size of
the global economy rises.
There are two polar cases. When σf is very high, the horizontal organizational form is ruled out regardless of
the value of S. The market outcome depends only upon the relative size S of countries. If the two countries do not
differ much in size (S > S¯), the equilibrium is I - I. Put differently, there are no FDIs and the mass of plants is
minimized. This configuration corresponds to the canonical model of intraindustry trade. As S decreases below the
threshold S¯, some 2-firms become vertical because country 1 is relatively bigger (I - IV). When the two countries
have very different sizes (S < φ/K), all 2-firms find it profitable to establish their plants in the larger country (I -
V), so that there is one-way trade from country 1 to country 2. In these three cases, (25) does not hold.
At the other extreme of the spectrum, when σf is very low all firms are horizontal (H - H). However, as S
decreases the corresponding domain shrinks because country 2 becomes too small for 1-firms to invest there. More
11There are 49 possible configurations. Depending on the values of the parameters σf , S, φ and ω, 10 of them are market equilibria.
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specifically, the configuration H - H emerges if and only if
σf <
(ω − φ)S
S + ω
.
In this case, there is no trade because the whole range of varieties is produced in each country. In other words,
FDI is a perfect substitute for trade, while the mass of plants is maximized.
When S > S¯, the two countries are similar enough to host the same types of organizational form, while the number
of horizontal firms keeps growing as σf decreases. Assume now that S < S holds. All configurations but one involve
asymmetric organizational forms between or within countries, that is, trade and FDI are imperfect substitutes. If σf
exceeds BR, some 2-firms invest abroad when country 1 is sufficiently large. As seen above, the equilibrium is given
by I - IV if and only if σf > BR and
φ
K
< S < S.
As σf falls below BR, the economy displays the mixed equilibrium (I - IVH) described in Proposition 1. What
happens when σf falls below BL? The equilibrium configuration depends on the relative size of the two countries.
More specifically, two cases may arise, that is, country 2 hosts either no V-firms or no I-firms.
(i) The configuration I - IH becomes the equilibrium outcome if and only if country 2 remains big enough, that
is, S > Sˆ where Sˆ is a bundle of φ and ω defined in the Supplemental Material, while
(ω − φ)max


S
φ+ S
,
1
1 + ωS

< σf < BL.
Indeed, the relative size of country 2 must be large enough for some 2-firms to remain integrated, while the others
are horizontal because fixed costs are sufficiently low.
When σf decreases further, two subcases may arise according to the value of S.
(i.a) IH - IH when S > S˜ (S˜ is a bundle of φ and ω defined in the Supplemental Material), that is, country 2 is
large enough for a few 1-firms to produce abroad;
(i.b) I - H when S < S˜ because country 2 is small, so that no 1-firm invests abroad and no 2-firm remains
integrated.
(ii) The configuration I - VH becomes the equilibrium outcome if and only if φ/K < S < Sˆ and
(1− φω)S
φ+ S
< σf < BL.
Indeed, some 2-firms choose to be either V-firms because country 2 is small or H-firms because fixed costs are low.
Next, when σf decreases further, I - VH becomes I - H because fixed costs are low enough for all 2-firms to be
horizontal.
Finally, as σf keeps falling we have, first, IH - H and, then, H - H, that is, the solution mentioned above.
In short, when fixed costs are not too high or too small, all 1-firms are integrated and the 2-firms choose at least
two different organizational forms. Although producer prices are the same regardless of how firms organize their
activities across space, it pays for the 2-firms to be different (except in the limit case of very small fixed costs). Thus,
working with a single spatial friction, e.g., trade costs, leads to a narrow set of equilibrium outcomes. On the other
hand, the 1-firms are integrated because they benefit from a direct access to the larger market. These firms choose
to be horizontal only when fixed costs are very low.
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Assume that the market outcome is given by the mixed equilibrium (I - IVH). When the drop in trade costs is
strong enough, the market outcome shifts to (I - IV) because investing in both countries ceases to be profitable. On
the other hand, when communication costs decrease, being integrated is no longer attractive for the 2-firms because
producing in the larger country is less expensive. As a result, the equilibrium becomes (I - VH). Thus, starting
from the same initial outcome, a gradual decrease in trade or communication costs leads to different outcomes. This
concurs with Proposition 4.
Likewise, if (I - VH) is the initial equilibrium outcome, when trade costs steadily decrease the economy moves
to (I - IV) through the mixed equilibrium. By contrast, for the same path to arise, communication costs must rise.
Hence, trade and communication costs have contrasted effects on the distribution of plants in the global economy.
To illustrate even further this, the trade-off between increasing returns and trade costs implies that the economy
moves from (IH - IH) to (I - IH) with a strong drop in trade costs. In contrast, the economy moves from (I - IH)
to (IH - IH) when communication costs fall sharply.
Combining this discussion with what we saw in Section 4, we may safely conclude that decreases in trade or
communication costs do not affect the geographical distribution of production in the same way.
6 Heterogeneous Firms
In this section, we study what Proposition 1 becomes in the case where firms differ a priori in productivity regardless
of the organizational form they choose. As in the homogeneous firm case, we focus on the configuration where country
2 hosts the three types of firms. It then follows from Appendix 1 that all 1-firms are integrated when θ is not too
large. We assume perfect sorting, i.e., firms sharing the same productivity choose the same organizational form.12
Only the most productive firms can afford to invest in two plants. Hence, the horizontal firms (if any) are always
the most productive. Consequently, it remains to investigate the following two cases. In the first one, the least
productive 2-firms are integrated: 1 < θv2 < θ
h
2 < θ, where θ
v
2 and θ
h
2 are the productivity thresholds such that a
I-firms has a productivity θ2 < θ
v
2, a V-firm has a productivity θ
v
2 < θ2 < θ
h
2 , while a H-firm has a productivity
θ2 > θ
h
2 . In the second case, the least productive 2-firms are vertical, i.e., 1 < θ
n
2 < θ
h
2 < θ. In the former case,
the equilibrium conditions are given by πn2 (θ
v
2) = π
v
2(θ
v
2) and π
v
2(θ
h
2) = π
h
2(θ
h
2) while they are π
n
2 (θ
n
2 ) = π
v
2(θ
n
2 ) and
πn2 (θ
h
2) = π
h
2(θ
h
2) in the latter.
In either case, the equilibrium conditions are equivalent to
∆∗1(θ
h
2) =
ω − φ
σf
s1 ·

θh2
σ−1
, (36)
∆∗2(θ
h
2) =
1− φω
σf
s2 ·

θh2
σ−1
. (37)
Note that (36) ((37)) is identical (18) ((19)) when firms are homogeneous since θh2 = 1.
Using (12), we may rewrite (36)-(37) as follows:
12Note that the I- and V-firms that have the same productivity earn the same profits. However, assuming that I- and V-firms have
different fixed labor requirement implies that the mid-productive firms always adopt the organizational form associated with the higher
fixed requirement. As a result, there is perfect sorting.
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∆∗1(θ
h
2) = A · [s1 + ωs2 − (ω − φ)n2] , (38)
∆∗2(θ
h
2) = A · [φs1 + s2 − (1− φω)v2] , (39)
where A is given by (11).
Following the same approach as in the homogeneous firm case, we find that (12) and (36)-(39) yields the following
expressions:
n∗2(θ
h
2) =
1
1 + S
·
1 + ωS
ω − φ
−

θh2
σ−1
A
·
1
σf
 , (40)
v∗2(θ
h
2) =
1
1 + S
·
 φ+ S
1− φω
−

θh2
σ−1
A
·
S
σf
 , (41)
h∗2(θ
h
2) =
s2
A
·
 θ¯
θh
2
θσ−1dG =
1
1 + S
·


θh2
σ−1
A
·
1 + S
σf
−
(1 + ωS)(1− φ2)
(ω − φ)(1− φω)
 . (42)
Since the left-hand side of (42) is decreasing and positive at θh2 = 1 while the right-hand side is increasing and
negative at θh2 = 1, (42) has a unique solution. Furthermore, this solution exceeds 1 and is smaller than θ. Plugging
this solution in (40) and (41) yields the corresponding equilibrium masses of I- and V-firms. As consequence, there
exists at most one equilibrium and the equilibrium value θh2 is independent of the respective masses of integrated
and vertical firms.
Similar to the homogenous firm case, it can be shown that (40)-(42) imply that country 2 hosts the three types
of firms if and only if the following condition holds:
BL <

θh2
σ−1
A
· σf < BR. (43)
Similarly, a mixed equilibrium with heterogeneous firms exists when
0 <
φ
K
< S < S <
1
K
< 1 (44)
holds.
Note that the conditions (40)-(42) boil down to (21)-(23), while (43)-(44) reduces to (24)-(25) when firms are
homogeneous because A/

θh2
σ−1
= 1.
It remains to determine whether the least productive 2-firms are integrated or vertical.
Case 1. Assume that the least productive firms are integrated: 1 < θv2 < θ
h
2 < θ. Computing the integrals in
(10) for the truncated Pareto distribution yields the following expressions:
n∗2 =
S
1 + S
·
1− (θv2)
−(κ−σ+1)
1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1) , (45)
v∗2 =
S
1 + S
·
(θv2)
−(κ−σ+1) −

θh2
−(κ−σ+1)
1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1) , (46)
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and
h∗2 =
S
1 + S
·

θh2
−(κ−σ+1)
−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1) . (47)
For the assumed configuration to be an equilibrium, the equations (40)-(42) and (45)-(47) must be consistent.
In particular, (46)-(47) and (41)-(42) must be equal. Using (36)-(37), we then obtain the equilibrium conditions
corresponding to the configuration 1 < θv2 < θ
h
2 :
θh2
−(κ−σ+1)
=
φKS2 + (K − 1)S − φ
(1− ωφ)S
·

1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
+ (1 + S) (θv2)
−(κ−σ+1) , (48)
and

θh2
σ−1
Aσf
−
S

θh2
−(κ−σ+1)
1 + S
·
1
θ¯
	κ−σ+1
− 1
=
(1 + φK)S + φ+K
(1− φω)(1 + S)
−
S
1 + S
·
1
θ¯
	κ−σ+1
− 1
. (49)
It remains to determine under which conditions the inequalities 1 < θv2 < θ
h
2 hold. We show in Appendix 4 that
this configuration is an equilibrium when S ∈ [φ/K, S], where the constant S is defined in the same appendix.
Case 2. Assume now that the least productive firms are vertical: 1 < θn2 < θ
h
2 < θ. Hence, n
∗
2 and v
∗
2 are given
by
n∗2 =
S
1 + S
·
(θn2 )
−(κ−σ+1) −

θh2
−(κ−σ+1)
1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1) , (50)
v∗2 =
S
1 + S
·
1− (θn2 )
−(κ−σ+1)
1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1) , (51)
while h∗2 is still given by (47).
Following the same approach as in the case above, we obtain the equilibrium conditions corresponding to the
configuration 1 < θn2 < θ
h
2 :
S

θh2
−(κ−σ+1)
= (1 + S) (θn2 )
−(κ−σ+1) −
ωKS2 + (K − 1)S − φ
(1− φω)S

1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
− 1, (52)

θh2
σ−1
Aσf
−
S

θh2
−(κ−σ+1)
1 + S
·
1
θ¯
	κ−σ+1
− 1
=
(1 + φK)S + φ+K
(1− φω)(1 + S)
−
S
1 + S
·
1
θ¯
	κ−σ+1
− 1
. (53)
Observe that (49) and (53) are the same. In other words, the equilibrium mass of H-firms is the same in the two
configurations. However, the equilibrium masses of I- and V-firms are not the same because (48) and (52) differ.
It remains to determine under which conditions 1 < θn2 < θ
h
2 < θ holds. We show in Appendix 5 that this
configuration is an equilibrium when S ∈ [S, S].
Our main findings may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6. Assume that firms are cost-heterogeneous. Then, a mixed equilibrium exists if and only if
(43) and (44) hold. This equilibrium is such that all 1-firms are integrated while the most productive 2-firms are
horizontal. Furthermore, when (i) S ∈ [φ/K, S] the least productive 2-firms are integrated, and (ii) S ∈ [S, S] the
least productive 2-firms are vertical.
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The intuition behind Proposition 6 is easy to grasp. The most productive firms choose to be horizontal because
this allows them to avoid paying trade costs which exceed communication costs. Which organizational form choose
the mid-productive firms depends on the relative size of countries. When the asymmetry is relatively high (bullet
(i) in Proposition 6) the mid-productive firms go vertical because they are able to provide the large market at lower
prices than under the I-form. However, if the asymmetry is mild (bullet (ii)), the local market matters more, which
leads the mid-productive firms to be integrated because they can supply the local market at lower prices than under
the V-form.
The effect of lowering trade and communication costs on the equilibrium configurations is more involved than
in the homogeneous firm case. Nevertheless, a few neat results hold true. First of all, we show in Appendix 6 that
θh2 always increases with φ and decreases with ω. Therefore, as in the homogeneous firm case, the mass of H-firms
decreases (increases) when trade costs (communication costs) fall.
Furthermore, for the configuration where the least productive firms are integrated, the first term in the right-hand
side of (48) decreases with ω, hence θv2 also decreases. Consequently, a drop in communication costs leads to fewer
I-firms, like in the homogeneous firm case, while the change in the mass of V-firms depend on the shape parameter
κ of productivity distribution. Similarly, decreasing trade costs leads to hike in θh2 , so that the left-hand side of
(48) decreases. Since the first term in the right-hand side of (48) increases when ω < ω, with ω = 2φ/(1 + φ2), θv2
increases, we may conclude that trade liberalization makes I-firms more profitable.13 Under these circumstances,
communication and trade costs have the same impacts on I-firms as in the homogeneous firm case. However, the
impact on the mass of V-firms is ambiguous.
Finally, regarding the configuration where the least productive firms are vertical, it can be shown that the second
term in the right-hand side of (52) increases with ω, so that the impact of ω on θn2 is ambiguous. However, trade
liberalization leads to an increase in θn2 . Similarly to homogeneous firm case, more firms thus choose to become
vertical when trade costs decrease if (i) communication costs are low enough, i.e., ω > ω∗ where ω∗ > ω, and (ii)
countries are sufficiently asymmetric, i.e., S ∈ (S∗, 1/K), where S∗ > S.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has shown that neglecting communication costs as a specific determinant of firms’ spatial structure
is unwarranted in the geography and trade literature. On the contrary, understanding how firms organize their
activities across space requires a clear distinction between communication and trade costs because these costs affect
firms’ choices differently. More specifically, both costs often have opposite impacts on the geography of production.
Since the social optimum also involves diversification under conditions similar to those obtained at the market
equilibrium, the diversification of organizational forms is driven by the fundamentals of the economy, especially trade
and communication costs.
Furthermore, identical firms may choose to become heterogeneous by choosing the whole range of organizational
forms. For this to arise, communication costs must be sufficiently low while trade costs cannot be too low. Under
similar conditions, the same holds for heterogeneous firms. In both the optimum and the market equilibrium, when
13The proof is given in Appendix 6.
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communication costs are lower than trade costs, the smaller country’s firms display three types of organizational
forms when the foreign market is sufficient large, but not too much, to permit some firms to go vertical or horizontal
whereas the others remain integrated. By contrast, the larger country’s firms choose to be spatial integrated since
they supply the large market without bearing any spatial friction.
How to measure of communication costs remains a difficult issue. Keller and Yeaple (2013) propose to solve this
problem by using knowledge-intensive inputs as a substitute for direct communication costs, while Giroux (2013)
focusses on airline connections. Though ingenious, both approaches remain incomplete.
Appendix 1
Step 1. (i) Assume that φ < ω < 1. We show that one country hosts only one type of firms at any mixed equilibrium.
Since only the most productive firms can afford to invest in two plants, the horizontal firms (if any) are the most
efficient ones. Consequently, the least productive firms are integrated or vertical. In the first case, the least productive
j-firms are integrated: 1 < θvj < θ
h
j < θ, where θ
v
j and θ
h
j are the productivity thresholds such that a I-firms has
a productivity θj < θ
v
j , a V-firm has a productivity θ
v
j < θj < θ
h
j , while a H-firm has a productivity θj > θ
h
j ; the
equilibrium conditions are given by πnj (θ
v
j ) = π
v
j (θ
v
j ). In the second, the least productive j-firms are vertical, i.e.,
1 < θnj < θ
h
j < θ. In the former case, and π
v
j (θ
h
j ) = π
h
j (θ
h
j ); the equilibrium conditions are π
n
j (θ
n
j ) = π
v
j (θ
n
j ) and
πnj (θ
h
j ) = π
h
j (θ
h
j ). Using (14)-(16), the equilibrium conditions are in both cases equivalent to
∆∗i =

θhj
σ−1
·
ω − φ
σf
si, (A.1)
∆∗j =

θhj
σ−1
·
1− φω
σf
sj , (A.2)
while the mirror-image equations for country i are as follows:
∆∗∗j =

θhi
σ−1
·
ω − φ
σf
sj , (A.3)
∆∗∗i =

θhi
σ−1
·
1− φω
σf
si. (A.4)
At any equilibrium in which one country hosts the three types of firms and the other two or three types, at least
two of the following conditions must hold: (i) ∆∗i = ∆
∗∗
i and (ii) ∆
∗
j = ∆
∗∗
j . However, ω − φ = 1 − φω because
ω < 1. This implies∆∗i = ∆
∗∗
i and∆
∗
j = ∆
∗∗
j . Hence, we have: (a) π
v
j (θ
h
j ) = π
h
j (θ
h
j )must hold when π
n
i (θ
h
i ) = π
h
i (θ
h
i );
(b) πnj (θ
h
j ) = π
h
j (θ
h
j ) when π
v
i (θ
h
i ) = π
h
i (θ
h
i ); and (c) π
n
j (θ
h
j ) = π
v
j (θ
h
j ) when π
n
i (θ
h
i ) = π
v
i (θ
h
i ). As a result, country i
can host only one type of firms when j-firms are fully diversified.
(ii) Assume now that ω = 1. It follows from (A.1)-(A.4) that
∆∗i
∆∗j
=
∆∗∗i
∆∗∗j
=
si
sj
, (A.5)
which implies θh ≡ θhi = θ
h
j . Therefore, using (13) and the equilibrium conditions π
h
i (θ
h
i ) = π
v
i (θ
h
i ) and π
v
i (θ
v
i ) =
πni (θ
v
i ) for i = 1, 2, as well as ni + vi + hi = si for i = 1, 2, we obtain:
∆∗i = A ·

si + sj − (1− φ)(n
∗
j + v
∗
i )

=

θh
σ−1
·
1− φ
σf
si, (A.6)
∆∗j = A ·

φsi + sj − (1− φ)(n
∗
i + v
∗
j )

=

θh
σ−1
·
1− φ
σf
sj . (A.7)
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Hence, we have three equations (A.5)-(A.7) and four unknowns, nj , vi, ni, vj . As a result, there is a continuum
of solutions to the equilibrium conditions.
Step 2. Assume a mixed equilibrium where the three types of firms coexist in country j. Then, all i-firms are
integrated when the productivity range of these firms is not “too” large: πni (θ) > π
v
i (θ) and π
n
i (θ) > π
h
i (θ) for all
θ ∈ [1, θ] if θ does not exceed some threshold.
Plugging (25) and (24) into (14)-(16) yields
πni (θ)− π
v
i (θ) =
θσ−1f
θhi
σ−1 1− φωω − φ − ω − φ1− φω

,
πni (θ)− π
h
i (θ) = f ·

1−

θ
θhi
σ−1
·
ω − φ
1− φω

.
First, πni (θ) > π
v
i (θ) for all θ since 1−φω > ω−φ. Second, since π
n
i (θ)−π
h
i (θ) is decreasing in θ, π
n
i (θ)−π
h
i (θ) > 0
if
πni (θ)− π
h
i (θ) > 0⇔ θ ≤ K
1
σ−1 · θhi , (A.8)
In the worst case, θhi ≈ 1 so that the desired inequality holds if θ ≤ K
1
σ−1 .
When firms are homogeneous (θhi = θ¯), (A.8) reduces to ω − φ < 1− φω, which always holds. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2
We first determine the candidate equilibrium values n∗j , v
∗
j , h
∗
j when n
∗
i = si and v
∗
i = h
∗
i = 0 and, then, find the
conditions for (21)—(23) to be positive. Finally, we show that i = 1 and j = 2.
Step 1. Substituting v∗i = 0 into (13) and setting A = 1 leads to ∆
∗
i = si + ωsj − (ω − φ)n
∗
j . Using (18) thus
yields (21) for j = 2. Substituting n∗i = si and ∆
∗
j into (13) yields (22) for j = 2. Substituting v
∗
j and n
∗
j into the
condition nj + vj + hj = sj, we obtain (23) for j = 2.
Step 2. Set S = sj/si. Using (21)-(23), the inequalities n
∗
j > 0, v
∗
j > 0 and h
∗
j > 0 are, respectively, equivalent
to the following conditions:
σf >
ω − φ
1 + ωS
σf >
(1− φω)S
φ+ S
σf <
(ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS)
,
which amounts to (24) where
BL ≡ max


ω − φ
1 + ωS
,
(1− φω)S
φ+ S

and BR ≡
(ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS)
.
Step 3. Observe first that the inequality
ω − φ
1 + ωS
<
(ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS)
may be rewritten as follows:
S >
φ
K
,
Furthermore, the inequality
(1− φω)S
φ+ S
<
(ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS)
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is equivalent to
F (S) ≡ φKS2 + (K − 1)S − φ < 0. (B.1)
Let S be the positive root of F (S) = 0. Since F (φ/K) < 0 and F (1/K) > 0, the condition (24) holds if and
only if
φ
K
< S < S <
1
K
,
which implies S < 1. Therefore, it must be that i = 1 and j = 2.
Step 4. Since 11+ωS is decreasing in S while
S
φ+S is increasing, the latter is smaller than the former if and only
if this inequality holds when S takes on its lowest value, that is, S = φ/K. Therefore, (24) and (25) are necessary
and sufficient for Proposition 1 to hold. Q.E.D.
Appendix 3
The proof involves several steps. First, we show that the solutions to the first-order conditions for, say, country i
cannot be all positive and determine the optimal values of ni, vi and hi under the assumption that the solutions to
the first-order conditions for country j are strictly positive (Steps 1 and 2). Then, we determine the necessary and
sufficient conditions for country j’s solutions to be strictly positive (Step 3), while Step 4 shows that the so-obtained
solutions maximize the total welfare W .
The first letter in the subscript of a variable stands for the firm’s HQ location while the second letter denotes the
supplied market. We use the constraint hj = sj − nj − vj > 0 to replace hj in Ui and W .
Step 1. Assume that the optimal solution is such that all three variables are strictly positive in country j.
Differentiating (28) yields the following system of equations:
∂W
∂nj
= sj
∂Uj
∂nj
+ si
∂Ui
∂nj
−Cnj +C
h
j = 0,
∂W
∂vj
= sj
∂Uj
∂vj
+ si
∂Ui
∂vj
−Cvj +C
h
j = 0, (C.1)
and
∂W
∂xnjj
= sj
∂Uj
∂xnjj
− nj
∂Cnj
∂xnjj
= 0⇔ xnjj =

1
cΩj
σ
,
∂W
∂xvjj
= sj
∂Uj
∂xvjj
− vj
∂Cvj
∂xvjj
= 0⇔ xvjj =

1
τγcΩj
σ
,
∂W
∂xhjj
= sj
∂Uj
∂xhjjj
− hj
∂Chj
∂xhjjj
= 0⇔ xhjj =

1
cΩj
σ
,
∂W
∂xnij
= sj
∂Uj
∂xnij
− ni
∂Cnj
∂xnij
= 0⇔ xnij =

1
τcΩj
σ
,
∂W
∂xvij
= sj
∂Uj
∂xvij
− vi
∂Cvj
∂xvij
= 0⇔ xvij =

1
γcΩj
σ
,
∂W
∂xhij
= sj
∂Uj
∂xhij
− hi
∂Chj
∂xhij
= 0⇔ xhij =

1
γcΩj
σ
, (C.2)
where
Ωj ≡ nj(x
n
jj)
σ−1
σ + vj(x
v
jj)
σ−1
σ + hj(x
h
jj)
σ−1
σ + ni(x
n
ij)
σ−1
σ + vi(x
v
ij)
σ−1
σ + hi(x
h
ij)
σ−1
σ .
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Substituting (C.2) into Ωj , we obtain
Ωσj =

σ
σ − 1
σ−1
Λj ,
where
Λj ≡ sj + ωsi − (ω − φ)ni − (1− φω)vj (C.3)
Furthermore, plugging (C.2) into the cost functions, we obtain:
Cnj = f +
sj
Λj
+
siφ
Λi
, (C.4)
Cvj = f +
sjφω
Λj
+
siω
Λi
, (C.5)
Chj = 2f +
sj
Λj
+
siω
Λi
. (C.6)
Differentiating Uj and Ui with respect to nj and vj and plugging (C.2) in the resulting expressions, we obtain
the following system of 4 equations:
∂Uj
∂nj
=
∂Ui
∂vj
= 0, (C.7)
∂Ui
∂nj
=
σ
σ − 1
(φ− ω)
1
Λi
< 0, (C.8)
∂Uj
∂vj
=
σ
σ − 1
(φω − 1)
1
Λj
< 0. (C.9)
Substituting (C.4)—(C.6) and (C.7)—(C.9) into (C.1) and solving for Λi and Λj yields the following expressions:
Λj =
sj(1− φω)
(σ − 1)f
Λi =
si(ω − φ)
(σ − 1)f
, (C.10)
which must hold at any interior optimal solution.
Step 2. Differentiating W with respect to ni, using (C.4), (C.6), (C.7) and (C.8) in terms of i instead of j, and
plugging (C.10) in the resulting expression yields:
∂W
∂ni
=
(1− ω)(1 + φ)
1− φω
f > 0. (C.11)
Therefore, the optimal solution cannot be interior. Moreover, it follows from (C.11) that noi = si, hence v
o
i =
hoi = 0, always maximize W when country j = i accommodates the three types of firms at the optimum.
Step 3.We now show when the first-order conditions for country j yield a strictly positive solution when noi = si
and voi = h
o
i = 0. Setting ni = si and vi = hi = 0 into Λi and Λj defined in (C.3) yields the following two expressions:
Λj = sj + φsi − (1− φω)vj Λi = si + ωsj − (ω − φ)nj . (C.12)
Equalizing (C.10) and (C.12) leads to two equations in nj and vj , which have a unique solution given by (30)
and (31). As for (32), it is given by hoj = sj − n
o
j − v
o
j . These three solutions are positive if and only if the following
conditions hold:
(σ − 1)f >
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
(σ − 1)f >
sj(1− φω)
sj + φsi
(σ − 1)f <
(ω − φ)(1− φω)
(1− φ2)(si + ωsj)
,
which are equivalent to (29). Given noi = si and v
o
i = h
o
i = 0, (30)—(32) are, therefore, positive and the unique
solution to the first-order conditions ∂W/∂nj = ∂W/∂vj = ∂W/∂hj = 0. If (29) holds, it must be noi = si and
voi = h
o
i = 0 because the solutions to the first-order conditions for country j are strictly positive.
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Step 4. We now check that (30) and (31) maximize W (nj , vj , sj − nj − vj , n
o
i , v
o
i , h
o
i ). Substituting the cost
functions (C.4)—(C.6) and the first-order conditions (C.7)—(C.9) into (C.1), we obtain the following two expressions:
∂W
∂nj
= f −
si(ω − φ)
Λi
1
σ − 1
∂W
∂vj
= f −
sj(1− φω)
Λj
1
σ − 1
.
Differentiating (C.12) yields:
∂Λi
∂nj
= −(ω − φ)
∂Λj
∂vj
= −(1− φω)
∂Λi
∂vj
=
∂Λj
∂nj
= 0.
It is thus readily verified that the Hessian ∂2W∂n2j ∂2W∂nj∂vj
∂2W
∂vj∂nj
∂2W
∂v2
j
 =
 − si(ω−φ)2Λ2i 1σ−1 0
0 −sj(1−φω)
2
Λ2
j
1
σ−1

has the following characteristic equation:
λ2 +
1
σ − 1

si(ω − φ)2
Λ2i
+
sj(1− φω)2
Λ2j

λ+

1
σ − 1
2
si(ω − φ)2
Λ2i
sj(1− φω)2
Λ2j
= 0,
which has two negative eigenvalues. Therefore, when (29) holds (30) and (31) maximize W (nj , vj , hj , ni, vi, hi).
Step 5. Finally, for BL < BR, we know from Appendix 2 that S must be smaller than 1. This implies that i = 1
and j = 2. Q.E.D.
Appendix 4
We determine the conditions on S for 1 < θv2 < θ
h
2 < θ¯ to hold.
Step 1. θv2 < θ
h
2 . This inequality holds if and only if the first term in the right-hand side of (48) is negative.
Since this inequality must hold for any value of θ¯, it boils down to (B.1) when θ¯ becomes arbitrarily large. Therefore,
we have S < S¯.
Step 2. θv2 > 1. Since θ
h
2 > 1 and the right-hand side of (48) decreases with θ
v
2, θ
v
2 > 1 holds if and only if the
right-hand side of (48) is smaller than 1 at θv2 = 1:
φKS2 + (K − 1)S − φ
(ω − φ)KS
·

1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
+ S < 0. (D.1)
Since (D.1) must hold for any value of θ¯, it boils down to
G2(S) ≡ ωKS
2 + (K − 1)S − φ < 0 (D.2)
when θ¯ grows indefinitely. Denoting by S the positive root of G2(S) = 0, (D.2) holds if and only if S < S. It is
readily verified that S < S¯. Thus, combining (44) and (D.2), we have 1 < θv2 < θ
h
2 < θ¯ if and only if φ/K < S < S.
Note also that these inequalities imply θh2 > 1. Q.E.D.
Appendix 5
We determine the conditions on S for 1 < θh2 < θ
v
2 < θ¯ to hold.
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Step 1. θn2 < θ
v
2. This inequality holds if and only if the first term in the right-hand side (52) is negative:
ωKS2 + (K − 1)S − φ
(1− φω)S

1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
+ 1 > 0,
which reduces to
G3(S) ≡ ωKS
2 + (K − φω)S − φ > 0 (E.1)
when θ¯ becomes arbitrarily large. The positive root of G3(S) = 0 being given by S = φ/K, (E.1) holds if and only
if S > φ/K.
Step 2. θn2 > 1. This holds if and only if the right-hand side of (52) is smaller than S at θ
n
2 = 1:
−
ωKS2 + (K − 1)S − φ
(1− φω)S

1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
< 0,
which is equivalent to
G2(S) > 0. (E.2)
when θ¯ becomes arbitrarily large.
Observe that (E.2) is the opposite of (D.2) and holds if and only if S > S. Summing up, we have 1 < θn2 < θ
v
2 < θ¯
if and only if S < S < S. Q.E.D.
Appendix 6
First, we study the impact of trade and commuting costs on the mass of H-firms. The left-hand side of (49) is an
increasing function of θh2 and does not depend on both φ and ω. The impact of changes in φ and ω on the right-hand
side of (49) is captured by the first term, which can be rewritten as follows:
(1 + φK)S + φ+K
(1− φω)(1 + S)
·

1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
=
1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
1 + S
·

1
1− φω
+
φ
ω − φ

S +
φ
1− φω
+
1
ω − φ

By differentiating this expression with respect to φ and ω, we obtain:
1
1− φω
+
φ
ω − φ

S +
φ
1− φω
+
1
ω − φ
′
φ
=

ω
(1− φω)2
+
ω
(ω − φ)2

S +
1
(1− φω)2
+
1
(ω − φ)2
> 0,

1
1− φω
+
φ
ω − φ

S +
φ
1− φω
+
1
ω − φ
′
ω
=

φ
(1− φω)2
−
φ
(ω − φ)2

S +
φ2
(1− φω)2
−
1
(ω − φ)2
< 0.
Therefore, θh2 increases with φ and decreases with ω, which implies that the mass of H-firms decreases (increases)
when trade costs (communication costs) fall.
Second, the left-hand side of (48) increases with ω, while the first term of the right-hand side
φKS2 + (K − 1)S − φ
(ω − φ)KS
·

1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
=
1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
S
·

φ
ω − φ
S2 +

1
ω − φ
−
1
1− φω

S −
φ
1− φω

decreases with ω:
−
φ
(ω − φ)2
S2 −

1
(ω − φ)2
+
φ
(1− φω)2

S −
φ2
(1− φω)2
< 0.
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Therefore, θv2 decreases with ω, which leads to fewer I-firms.
Third, the left-hand side of (48) decreases with φ, while the behavior of first term in the right-hand side of (48)
is a priori undetermined:
φ
ω − φ
S2 +

1
ω − φ
−
1
1− φω

S −
φ
1− φω
′
φ
=
ωK2S2 + (K2 − ω)S − 1
(1− φω)2
.
The right-hand side of this expression has a unique positive root smaller than 1. Since the range of countries’
asymmetry we work with is φ/K < S < S < 1/K, the derivative is positive at S = 1/K:
ωK2S2 + (K2 − ω)S − 1
(1− φω)2
|S= 1
K
=
ωK2 1K2 + (K
2 − ω) 1K − 1
(1− φω)2
=
(K − 1)( ωK + 1)
(1− φω)2
> 0.
When S = φ/K, the derivative
ωK2S2 + (K2 − ω)S − 1
(1− φω)2
|S= φ
K
=
ωK2 φ
2
K2 + (K
2 − ω) φK − 1
(1− φω)2
=

ωφ
K + 1

(φK − 1)
(1− φω)2
,
is also positive if φK − 1 > 0, which is equivalent to
ω < ω =
2φ
1 + φ2
.
In sum, θv2 decreases with φ for all admissible countries’ degrees of asymmetry when communication costs are not
too large, i.e., ω < ω.
Last, the left-hand side of (52) decreases with φ. In the right-hand side, only the second term given by
−
ωKS2 + (K − 1)S − φ
(1− ωφ)S

1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
= −
1−

θ
	−(κ−σ+1)
S

ω
ω − φ
S2 +

1
ω − φ
−
1
1− φω

S −
φ
1− φω

.
is affected by φ. By differentiating the above expression, we obtain:
−

ω
ω − φ
S2 +

1
ω − φ
−
1
1− φω

S −
φ
1− φω
′
φ
= −
ωK2S2 + (K2 − ω)S − 1
(1− φω)2
,
which is negative when S = 1/K and positive at S = φ/K if ω > ω. Moreover, when ω = 1 the derivative is positive
for S = S. Therefore, ω∗ > ω exists such that for ω > ω∗, there is a threshold value S∗ such that the derivative is
positive for S ∈ (S∗, 1/K). Hence, θn2 increases with φ.
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Supplemental Material
Proof of Proposition 5.
There are 49 possible configurations. Proposition 1 shows that (I - IVH) is an equilibrium. Besides, it also rules
out the 6 configurations in which the smaller country hots I-firms, V-firms and H-firms and the larger country hosts
H-firms only, V-firms only, two or three types of firms, as well as the 6 configurations in which the larger country
hosts the three types of firms regardless of the configurations with one or two types of firms in the smaller country.
So, we have to consider the remaining 36 configurations.
Step A. The following 21 configurations are never an equilibrium.
(A.1) (V - V) is not an equilibrium.
Assume that (V - V) is an equilibrium. In this case, πvi > π
n
i and π
v
j > π
n
j . Using (14)-(16), we obtain:
πvi > π
n
i ⇔
∆∗i
∆∗j
>
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
, πvj > π
n
j ⇔
∆∗j
∆∗i
>
1− φω
ω − φ
sj
si
.
Combining these two inequalities yields 1− φω < ω − φ, a contradiction since ω < 1. Q.E.D.
(A.2) (V - H) and (H - V) are not equilibria.
If all i-firm choose to be vertical, then πvi > π
h
i . If all j-firms choose to be horizontal, then π
h
j > π
n
j . Using
(14)-(16), we obtain:
πvi > π
h
i ⇔ ∆∗i > (1− φω)
si
σf
πhj > π
n
j ⇔ (ω − φ)
si
σf
> ∆∗i .
Note that (ω − φ) si
σf
> (1 − φω) si
σf
is equivalent to 1 − φω < ω − φ, a contradiction. The mirror-image equations
lead to a contradiction for H - V. Similar arguments are applicable to the subsequent cases. Q.E.D.
(A.3) (IV - H) and (H - IV) are not equilibria.
If no i-firms chooses to be horizontal, then πvi > π
h
i . If all j-firm choose to be horizontal, then π
h
j > π
n
j . Using
(14)-(16), we obtain:
πvi > π
h
i ⇔ ∆∗i > (1− φω)
si
σf
, πhj > π
n
j ⇔ (ω − φ)
si
σf
> ∆∗i .
As in (A.2), these inequalities lead to a contradiction. Q.E.D.
(A.4) (H - VH) and (VH - H) are not equilibria.
Using (15) and (16), it is readily verified that πvj = π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗j = (1−φω) sjσf . If all i-firms choose to be horizontal,
then πhi > π
n
i ⇔ (ω − φ) sjσf > ∆∗j . Substituting ∆∗j = (1 − φω) sjσf into (ω − φ) sjσf > ∆∗j yields 1 − φω < ω − φ, a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
(A.5) (V - IH) and (IH - V) are not equilibria.
Using (14) and (16), we have: πnj = π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗i = (ω − φ) siσf . If all i-firms choose to be vertical, then πvi > πhi ⇔
∆∗i > (1 − φω) siσf . Substituting ∆∗i = (ω − φ) siσf into ∆∗i > (1 − φω) siσf ⇔ (ω − φ) siσf yields 1 − φω < ω − φ, a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
(A.6) (VH - V) and (V - VH) are not equilibria.
If i-firms are horizontal or vertical, then πhi > π
n
i . If all j-firms choose to be vertical, then π
v
j > π
h
j . Using
(14)-(16), we obtain:
πhi > π
n
i ⇔ (ω − φ)
sj
σf
> ∆∗j , π
v
j > π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗j > (1− φω)
sj
σf
.
1
Since (ω − φ) sj
σf
> (1− φω) sj
σf
is equivalent to 1− φω < ω − φ, we get a contradiction. Q.E.D.
(A.7) (IV - V) and (V - IH) are not equilibria.
If i-firms are integrated or vertical, then πni = π
v
i . If all j-firm choose to be vertical, then π
v
j > π
n
j . Using
(14)-(16) leads to
πni = π
v
i ⇔
∆∗i
∆∗j
=
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
, πvj > π
n
j ⇔
∆∗j
∆∗i
>
1− φω
ω − φ
sj
si
.
Combining these inequalities yields 1− φω < ω − φ, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
(A.8) (VH - IH) and (IH - VH) are not equilibria.
Using (14)-(16), we obtain:
πnj = π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗i =
ω − φ
σf
si, π
v
i = π
h
i ⇔ ∆∗∗i =
1− φω
σf
si.
If country i hosts V-firms and H-firms and country j hosts I-firms and H-firms, then ∆∗i = ∆
∗∗
i , i.e. a contra-
diction. A similar argument applies to (IH - VH). Q.E.D.
(A.9) (IV - IV) is not an equilibrium.
Using (14)-(16), we obtain:
πnj = π
v
j ⇔ ∆∗j/∆∗i =
1− φω
ω − φ
sj
si
, πni = π
v
i ⇔ ∆∗∗i /∆∗∗j =
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
.
If each country hosts I-firms and V-firms, the condition ∆∗i /∆
∗
j = ∆
∗∗
i /∆
∗∗
j must hold. However, si = sj implies
∆∗i /∆
∗
j = ∆∗∗i /∆∗∗j , a contradiction. Q.E.D.
(A.10) (IV - VH) and (VH - IV) are not equilibria.
Using (14)-(16), we obtain:
πvj = π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗j = (1− φω)
sj
σf
, πni = π
v
i ⇔ ∆∗i /∆∗j =
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
.
Combining ∆∗j = (1− φω) sjσf and ∆∗i /∆∗j = 1−φωω−φ sisj yields ∆∗i =
(1−φω)2
ω−φ
si
σf
.
If j-firms are horizontal or vertical, then πhj > π
n
j . Using (14) and (16), we obtain π
h
j > π
n
j ⇔ (ω − φ) siσf > ∆∗i .
Substituting ∆∗i =
(1−φω)2
(ω−φ)
si
σf
into (ω − φ) si
σf
> ∆∗i yields 1− φω < ω − φ, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
(A.11) (IV - IH) and (IH - IV) are not equilibria.
Using (14)-(16), we find:
πnj = π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗i = (ω − φ)
si
σf
, πni = π
v
i ⇔ ∆∗i /∆∗j =
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
.
Combining ∆∗i = (ω − φ) siσf and ∆∗i /∆∗j = 1−φωω−φ sisj yields ∆∗j =
(ω−φ)2
1−φω
sj
σf
. If i-firms are integrated or vertical,
then πvi > π
h
i ⇔ ∆∗i > (1− φω) siσf . Substituting ∆∗i = (ω − φ) siσf into ∆∗i > (1 − φω) siσf yields 1− φω < ω − φ, a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
(A.12) (VH - VH) is not an equilibrium.
Using (14)-(16), we get:
πvi = π
h
i ⇔ ∆∗i = (1− φω)
si
σf
, πvj = π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗j = (1− φω)
sj
σf
.
If i-firms choose to be vertical or horizontal, then πhi > π
n
i ⇔ (ω − φ) sjσf > ∆∗j . Substituting ∆∗j = (1− φω) sjσf
into (ω − φ) sj
σf
> ∆∗j yields 1− φω < ω − φ, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
2
Step B. Besides the mixed equilibrium, there exist 9 equilibria defined over specific domains of parameters, while
the remaining 6 configurations are not equilibria.
(B.1) (H - H) is an equilibrium.
Setting n∗i = v
∗
i = n
∗
j = v
∗
j = 0 in (13) yields ∆
∗
i = si + ωsj and ∆
∗
j = sj + ωsi. If firms choose to be neither
integrated nor vertical, it must be that πvi < π
h
i , π
n
i < π
h
i , π
n
j < π
h
j , and π
v
j < π
h
j . Using (14)-(16), we obtain:
πvi < π
h
i ⇔ ∆∗i < (1− φω)
si
σf
, πni < π
h
i ⇔ ∆∗j < (ω − φ)
sj
σf
,
πvj < π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗j < (1− φω)
sj
σf
, πnj < π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗i < (ω − φ)
si
σf
,
which amounts to
si + ωsj < (1− φω) si
σf
.
Then, πvi < π
h
i , π
n
i < π
h
i , π
n
j < π
h
j , and π
v
j < π
h
j if and only if
σf < min

(1− φω)si
si + ωsj
,
(ω − φ) sj
sj + ωsi
,
(1− φω)sj
sj + ωsi
,
(ω − φ) si
si + ωsj

.
Consequently, (H - H) is an equilibrium if and only if
σf <
(ω − φ)S
S + ω
.
Q.E.D.
(B.2) (IH - H) is an equilibrium and (H - IH) is not an equilibrium.
We determine n∗j and h
∗
j when h
∗
i = si and v
∗
j = n
∗
i = v
∗
i = 0. Using (14) and (16), we obtain π
n
j = π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗i =
(ω − φ) si
σf
. Substituting v∗i = 0 and ∆
∗
i into (13) yields
n∗j =
si + ωsj
ω − φ −
si
σf
, h∗j = −
si + sjφ
ω − φ +
si
σf
.
Substituting n∗i = v
∗
j = 0 into (13) yields ∆
∗
j = sj + ωsi. Using (14)-(16) and substituting ∆
∗
i and ∆
∗
j leads to
πnj > π
v
j ⇔
(1− φω)
(ω − φ)
sj
si
>
∆∗j
∆∗i
, πhj > π
v
j ⇔ ∆∗j < (1− φω)
sj
σf
,
πhi > π
n
i ⇔ ∆∗j < (ω − φ)
sj
σf
, πhi > π
v
i ⇔ ∆∗i < (1− φω)
sj
σf
.
Therefore, we have πhi > π
n
i , π
h
i > π
v
i , π
n
j > π
v
j , and π
h
j > π
v
j if and only if
σf <
sj (ω − φ)
sj + ωsi
(S.1)
holds.
The inequalities n∗j > 0 and h
∗
j > 0 are, respectively, equivalent to:
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
< σf <
(ω − φ)si
sjφ+ si
. (S.2)
It follows from (S.1) and (S.2) that
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
< σf < min

(ω − φ)si
sjφ+ si
,
(ω − φ) sj
sj + ωsi

.
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Observe that
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
<
(ω − φ)si
φsj + si
is equivalent to φ < ω.
Finally,
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
<
(ω − φ) sj
sj + ωsi
is equivalent to si < sj . Therefore, j is the larger country, that is, j = 1. This implies that (H - IH) is not an
equilibrium, for otherwise we would have s1 < s2, a contradiction.
Using s1 = 1/(1+S), the necessary and sufficient conditions for (IH - H) to be an equilibrium may be rewritten
as follows:
(ω − φ)S
ω + S
< σf < min

(ω − φ)S
φ+ S
,
ω − φ
1 + ωS

.
Q.E.D.
(B.3) (I - H) is an equilibrium and (H - I) is not an equilibrium.
Setting n∗i = si, h
∗
j = sj , and v
∗
i = n
∗
j = v
∗
j = 0 into (13), we obtain ∆
∗
i = si + ωsj and ∆
∗
j = sj + φsi.
If all i-firms choose to be integrated and all j-firms choose to be horizontal, we have πvi < π
n
i , π
h
i < π
n
i , π
v
j < π
h
j ,
and πnj < π
h
j . Using (14)-(16), we obtain:
πni > π
v
i ⇔
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
>
∆∗i
∆∗j
, πhi < π
n
i ⇔ (ω − φ)
sj
σf
< ∆∗j ,
πvj < π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗j < (1− φω)
sj
σf
, πhj > π
n
j ⇔ (ω − φ)
si
σf
> ∆∗i .
Thus, πvi < π
n
i , π
h
i < π
n
i , π
v
j < π
h
j , and π
n
j < π
h
j hold if and only if
(ω − φ) sj
sj + φsi
< σf < min

(1− φω)sj
sj + φsi
,
(ω − φ) si
si + ωsj

and
si + ωsj
sj + φsi
<
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
.
Since ω < 1, it is readily verified that
(ω − φ) sj
sj + φsi
<
(1− φω)sj
sj + φsi
holds. Observe that
(ω − φ) sj
sj + φsi
<
(ω − φ) si
si + ωsj
(S.3)
is equivalent to fB3(si) > 0 where
fB3(si) ≡ −(ω − φ)s2i + 2ωsi − ω.
Since fB3(1/2) < 0 and fB3(1) > 0, it must be that si > 1/2, that is, i = 1.
As s1 = 1/(1+S), we have fB3(s1)/s
2
1 = φ−ωS2 ≡ H(S). Since H(0) > 0 and H(1) < 0, (S.3) holds if and only
if
0 < S < S < 1,
where S ≡φ/ω is the positive root of H(S) = 0.
Finally, observe that
si+ωsj
sj+φsi
< 1−φω
ω−φ
si
sj
is equivalent to
(ω−φ)sj
sj+φsi
< (1−φω)si
si+ωsj
, which follows from (S.3).
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Summing up, (I - H) is an equilibrium if and only if
(ω − φ)S
φ+ S
< σf < min

(1− φω)S
φ+ S
,
ω − φ
1 + ωS

and
0 < S < S < 1
hold. Q.E.D.
(B.4) (IH - IH) is an equilibrium.
We determine n∗i , h
∗
i , n
∗
j when h
∗
j and v
∗
i = v
∗
j = 0. Using (14) and (16), we obtain:
πhj = π
n
j ⇔ ∆∗i = (ω − φ)
si
σf
πhi = π
n
i ⇔ ∆∗j = (ω − φ)
sj
σf
.
Substituting v∗i = 0 and ∆
∗
i into (13) yields
n∗j =
si + ωsj
ω − φ −
si
σf
.
Likewise, substituting v∗j = 0 and ∆
∗
j into (13) yields
n∗i =
sj + ωsi
ω − φ −
sj
σf
.
Therefore,
h∗i = −
φsi + sj
ω − φ +
sj
σf
h∗j = −
φsj + si
ω − φ +
si
σf
.
We show that no firm chooses to be vertical. Using (14)-(16) and substituting ∆∗i = (ω − φ) siσf and ∆∗j =
(ω − φ) sj
σf
into πni > π
v
i , π
h
i > π
v
i , π
n
j > π
v
j , and π
h
j > π
v
j , we obtain:
πni > π
v
i ⇔
(1− φω)
(ω − φ)
si
sj
>
∆∗i
∆∗j
, πhi > π
v
i ⇔ ∆∗i < (1− φω)
si
σf
,
πnj > π
v
j ⇔
(1− φω)
(ω − φ)
sj
si
>
∆∗j
∆∗i
, πhj > π
v
j ⇔ ∆∗j < (1− φω)
sj
σf
,
which hold since φ < ω < 1.
The inequalities n∗i > 0, h
∗
i > 0, n
∗
j > 0, and h
∗
j > 0 are, respectively, equivalent to the following conditions:
σf >
(ω − φ)sj
sj + ωsi
, σf <
(ω − φ)sj
φsi + sj
, σf >
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
, σf <
(ω − φ)si
φsj + si
,
which amount to
max

(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
,
(ω − φ)sj
sj + ωsi

< σf < min

(ω − φ)si
φsj + si
,
(ω − φ)sj
φsi + sj

. (S.4)
Observe that
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
<
(ω − φ)si
φsj + si
and
(ω − φ)sj
sj + ωsi
<
(ω − φ)sj
φsi + sj
hold since φ < ω.
Furthermore,
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
<
(ω − φ)sj
φsi + sj
(S.5)
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is equivalent to fB4(si) > 0 where
fB4(si) ≡ (ω − φ)s2i − 2ωsi + ω = −fB3(si).
Likewise,
(ω − φ)sj
sj + ωsi
<
(ω − φ)si
φsj + si
(S.6)
is equivalent to gB4(si) > 0 where
gB4(si) ≡ (ω − φ)s2i + 2φsi − φ.
Since fB4(si) = −fB3(si), fB4(0) < 0, fB4(1/2) < 0, and fB4(1) > 0, while gB4(0) < 0, gB4(1/2) > 0, and
gB4(1) > 0, (S.5) and (S.6) hold if and only if
0 < S < S < 1
ω − φ
1 + ωS
< σf <
(ω − φ)S
φ+ S
, (S.7)
where (S.7) comes from (S.4). Since fB4(si) = gB4(1 − si), the above conditions holds for both i = 1 and i = 2.
Q.E.D.
(B.5) (I - IV) is an equilibrium and (IV - I) is not an equilibrium.
We determine n∗j and v
∗
j when n
∗
i = si and h
∗
j = v
∗
i = h
∗
i = 0. Using (14) and (15), we obtain π
n
j = π
v
j ⇔
(1−φω)
(ω−φ)
sj
si
=
∆∗j
∆∗
i
.
Substituting n∗i = si, v
∗
i = 0 into (13) yields
∆∗i = si + ωsj − (ω − φ)nj ∆∗j = sj + φsi − (1− φω)vj .
Combining (1−φω)(ω−φ)
sj
si
=
∆∗j
∆∗
i
, vj = sj − nj , ∆∗i , and ∆∗i yields
n∗j =
−(1− φ2)(1− ω)s2i + [(1− φω) (1− φ− ω)− (ω − φ)]si + (1− φω)ω
(1− φω) (ω − φ)
and
v∗j =
(1− φ2)(1− ω)s2i − (1− φ)(1− ω − 2ωφ)si − (1− φω)φ
(1− φω) (ω − φ) .
The inequalities n∗j > 0 and v
∗
j > 0 are, respectively, equivalent to the conditions:
fB5(si) > 0 gB5(si) > 0
where
fB5(si) ≡ −(1− φ2)(1− ω)s2i + [(1− φω) (1− φ− ω)− (ω − φ)]si + (1− φω)ω
and
gB5(si) ≡ (1− φ2)(1− ω)s2i − (1− φ)(1− ω − 2ωφ)si − (1− φω)φ.
Since fB5(1/2) > 0, fB5

1−φω
1−φ2

= 0, and fB5 (1) < 0, while gB5 (1/2) < 0, gB5(1/2) < 0, gB5

1−φω
1−φ2

> 0, and
gB5 (1) > 0, n
∗
j > 0 and h
∗
j > 0 if and only if
0 < si < si <
1− φω
1− φ2 ,
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where si is the positive root of gB5(si) = 0. Since si > 1/2, i is the larger country, that is, i = 1.
We now show that all i-firms choose to be integrated and no j-firm chooses to be horizontal. Substituting n∗j
into ∆∗i leads to ∆
∗
i = (1− φ2)si ωsj+si1−φω . Since πnj = πvj ⇔ (1−φω)(ω−φ) sjsi =
∆∗j
∆∗
i
, we obtain ∆∗j = (1− φ2)sj ωsj+siω−φ . Using
(14)-(16) and substituting ∆∗i and ∆
∗
j yields:
πvi < π
n
i ⇔
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
>
∆∗i
∆∗j
, πhi < π
n
i ⇔ (ω − φ)
sj
σf
< ∆∗j ,
πhj < π
v
j ⇔ ∆∗j > (1− φω)
sj
σf
, πhj < π
n
j ⇔ (ω − φ)
si
σf
< ∆∗i .
Hence, πni > π
v
i , π
n
i > π
h
i , π
n
j > π
h
j and π
v
j > π
h
j hold if and only if
(ω − φ)(1− φω)
(1− φ2)(ωsj + si)
< σf .
Using (B.1) in Appendix 2 shows that F (S) = −gB5(s1)/[s21(ω−φ)]. Therefore, (I - IV) is an equilibrium if and
only if
(ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS) < σf
and
φ
K
< S < S,
where S is the positive root of F (S) = 0. Q.E.D.
(B.6) (I - VH) is an equilibrium and (VH - I) is not an equilibrium.
We determine v∗j and h
∗
j when n
∗
i = si and n
∗
j = v
∗
i = h
∗
i = 0. Using (15) and (16) leads to π
v
j = π
h
j ⇔
∆∗j = (1− φω) sjσf . Substituting n∗j = 0 and ∆∗j into (13) yields
v∗j =
sj + φsi
1− φω −
sj
σf
.
Then, we obtain
h∗j =
sj
σf
− φsi + φωsj
1− φω .
We now show that all i-firms choose to be integrated and no j-firms chooses to be integrated. Substituting
v∗i = n
∗
j = 0 into (13) leads to ∆
∗
i = si + ωsj . Using (14)-(16) and substituting ∆
∗
i and ∆
∗
j leads to
πvi < π
n
i ⇔
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
>
∆∗i
∆∗j
, πhi < π
n
i ⇔ (ω − φ)
sj
σf
< ∆∗j ,
πnj < π
h
j ⇔ (ω − φ)
si
σf
> ∆∗i , π
n
j < π
v
j ⇔
(1− φω)
(ω − φ)
sj
si
<
∆∗j
∆∗i
.
Hence, πni > π
v
i , π
n
i > π
h
i , π
h
j > π
n
j , and π
v
j > π
n
j hold if and only if
σf <
(ω − φ) si
si + ωsj
. (S.8)
The inequalities v∗j > 0 and h
∗
j > 0 are, respectively, equivalent to the following conditions:
(1− φω)sj
sj + φsi
< σf <
(1− φω)sj
φωsj + φsi
. (S.9)
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Combining (S.8) and (S.9) leads to
(1− φω)sj
sj + φsi
< σf < min

(ω − φ) si
si + ωsj
,
(1− φω)sj
φωsj + φsi

.
Observe that the expression
(1− φω)sj
sj + φsi
<
(ω − φ) si
si + ωsj
is equivalent to fB6(si) > 0 where
fB6(si) ≡ [(1− φω)(1− ω)− (ω − φ) (1− φ)]s2i + [(ω − φ)− (1− φω)(1− 2ω)]si − ω(1− φω).
Since fB6(1/2) < 0 and fB6(1) > 0, we have
1/2 < si < si < 1,
where si is the positive root of fB6(si) = 0. Therefore, i must be the larger country, that is, i = 1.
Since φω < 1, we have:
(1− φω)sj
sj + φsi
<
(1− φω)sj
φωsj + φsi
.
Since
−fB6(s1)/[s21 (ω − φ)] = ωKS2 + (K − 1)S − φ ≡ J(S),
the necessary and sufficient conditions (I - VH) to be an equilibrium are:
(1− φω)S
φ+ S
< σf < min

ω − φ
1 + ωS
,
(1− φω)S
φ+ φωS

and
0 < S < S < 1,
where S is the positive root of J(S) = 0. Q.E.D.
(B.7) (I - IH) is an equilibrium and (IH - I) is not an equilibrium.
We determine n∗j and h
∗
j when n
∗
i = si and v
∗
j = h
∗
j = h
∗
i = 0. Using (14) and (15), we obtain π
h
j = π
n
j ⇔ ∆∗i =
(ω − φ) si
σf
. Substituting v∗i = 0 and ∆
∗
i into (13) yields
n∗j =
si + ωsj
ω − φ −
si
σf
h∗j = −
φsj + si
ω − φ +
si
σf
.
The inequalities n∗j > 0 and h
∗
j > 0 are, respectively, equivalent to the following conditions:
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
< σf <
(ω − φ)si
sjφ+ si
.
Since φ < ω, it is readily verified that
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
<
(ω − φ)si
sjφ+ si
.
We now show that all i-firms choose to be integrated and no j-firm chooses to be vertical. Substituting n∗i = si
and v∗j = 0 into (13) leads to ∆
∗
j = sj + φsi. Using (14)-(16) and substituting ∆
∗
i and ∆
∗
j ,
πnj > π
v
j ⇔
(1− φω)
(ω − φ)
sj
si
>
∆∗j
∆∗i
, πvj < π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗j < (1− φω)
sj
σf
,
πni < π
h
i ⇔ (ω − φ)
sj
σf
> ∆∗j , π
v
i < π
h
i ⇔ ∆∗i < (1− φω)
si
σf
,
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we find that πhi > π
n
i , π
h
i > π
v
i , π
n
j > π
v
j , and π
h
j > π
v
j hold if and only if
(ω − φ) sj
sj + φsi
< σf <
(1− φω)sj
sj + φsi
.
Note that (ω−φ)sj
sj+φsi
< (1−φω)sj
sj+φsi
holds since ω < 1.
Observe that the expression
(ω − φ) sj
sj + φsi
<
(ω − φ)si
sjφ+ si
is equivalent to sj < si. Thus, i must be the larger country, that is, i = 1.
Furthermore,
(ω − φ)si
si + ωsj
<
(1− φω)sj
sj + φsi
⇔ ω − φ
1 + ωS
<
(1− φω)S
φ+ S
,
which is equivalent to fB7(si) > 0 where
fB7(si) ≡ −[(1− φω)(1− ω)− (ω − φ) (1− φ)]s2i − [(ω − φ)− (1− φω)(1− 2ω)]si + ω(1− φω) = −fB6(si).
Since fB7(0) > 0, fB7(1/2) > 0, and fB7(1) < 0, we have:
1/2 < s1 < s1 < 1
where s1 is the positive root of fB8(s1) = 0.
In short, the conditions for (I - IH) to be an equilibrium are as follows:
max

(ω − φ)S
φ+ S
,
ω − φ
1 + ωS

< σf < min

(1− φω)S
φ+ S
,
ω − φ
1 + φS

and
0 < S < S < 1,
where S is the solution to J(S) = 0. Q.E.D.
(B.8) (I - V) is an equilibrium and (V - I) is not an equilibrium.
Setting n∗i = si, v
∗
j = sj , and v
∗
i = n
∗
j = 0 in (13), we obtain ∆
∗
i = si + ωsj and ∆
∗
j = φsi + φωsj .
If all i-firms choose to be integrated and all j-firms choose to be vertical, it must be that πvi < π
n
i , π
h
i < π
n
i ,
πnj < π
v
j , and π
h
j < π
v
j . Using (14)-(16), we get:
πni > π
v
i ⇔
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
>
∆∗i
∆∗j
, πhi < π
n
i ⇔ ∆∗j > (ω − φ)
sj
σf
,
πnj < π
v
j ⇔
1− φω
ω − φ
sj
si
<
∆∗j
∆∗i
, πvj > π
h
j ⇔ ∆∗j > (1− φω)
sj
σf
.
Hence, πvi < π
n
i , π
h
i < π
n
i , π
n
j < π
v
j , and π
h
j < π
v
j if and only if
1
φ
<
ω − φ
1− φω
si
sj
(S.10)
and
(1− φω)sj
φsi + φωsj
< σf.
Rewriting (S.10) yields
1 <
1
φ
1− φω
ω − φ <
si
sj
,
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so that i must be the larger country, that is, i = 1.
To sum up, the conditions for the larger country to host only I-firms and the smaller country to host only V-firms
are:
0 < S <
φ
K
and
(1− φω)S
φ+ φωS
< σf.
Q.E.D.
(B.9) (I - I) is an equilibrium.
Setting n∗i = si, n
∗
j = sj and v
∗
i = v
∗
j = 0 in (13), we obtain ∆
∗
i = si + φsj and ∆
∗
j = sj + φsi.
When no firm chooses to be vertical or horizontal, we have πvi < π
n
i , π
h
i < π
n
i , π
v
j < π
n
j , and π
h
j < π
n
j . Using
(14)-(16), we obtain:
πvi < π
n
i ⇔
∆∗i
∆∗j
<
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
, πhi < π
n
i ⇔ (ω − φ)
sj
σf
< ∆∗j ,
πvj < π
n
j ⇔
∆∗j
∆∗i
<
1− φω
ω − φ
sj
si
, πhj < π
n
j ⇔ (ω − φ)
si
σf
< ∆∗i .
Hence, πvi < π
n
i , π
h
i < π
n
i , π
v
j < π
n
j , and π
h
j < π
n
j if and only if
ω − φ
1− φω
si
sj
<
si + φsj
sj + φsi
<
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
and
max

(ω − φ) si
si + φsj
,
(ω − φ) sj
sj + φsi

< σf . (S.11)
Note that
ω − φ
1− φω
si
sj
<
si + φsj
sj + φsi
(S.12)
is equivalent to fB9(si) > 0 where
fB9(si) ≡ − (1− ω) (1− φ2)s2i + (1− φ)(1− ω − 2ωφ)si + φ(1− φω) = −gB5(si).
Since fB9(1/2) > 0 and fB9 (1) < 0, (S.12) holds if and only if
0 < si < s < 1 (S.13)
where s is the positive root of fB9(si) = 0.
Likewise, the expression
si + φsj
sj + φsi
<
1− φω
ω − φ
si
sj
(S.14)
is equivalent to
gB9(si) ≡ −(1− ω)(1− φ2)s2i + [(1− φω)− (ω − φ) (1− 2φ)]si − (ω − φ)φ = fB9(sj) > 0.
Since gB9(1/2) > 0 and gB9 (1) > 0, (S.14) holds if and only if
0 < s < si < 1, (S.15)
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where s is the positive root of gB9(si) = 0. As fB9(1/2) > 0 and gB9(1/2) > 0, i can be either the larger country or
the smaller country.
Since gB9(1−s1) = fB9(s1) and gB9(1−s2) = fB9(s2), it follows from (S.11), (S.13), and (S.15) that each country
to host only I-firms if and only i
0 < S < S < 1 (S.16)
and
ω − φ
1 + φS
< σf, (S.17)
hold. Q.E.D.
Step C. We study the ordering of the thresholds S, S, and S. First, since J(S) is increasing on [0, 1] and
J(φ/K) < 0, J(S) = 0, and J(S) > 0, it must be that φ/K < S < S. Second, we have:
F (S) ≷ 0⇔ ̺(ω, φ) ≡ ω√ω +φω + φ2 − φ− 1	√ω − φφ ≷ 0⇔ S ≷ S.
Since F (0) = J(0) and J(S) > F (S) for any S > 0, it must be that S < S. Therefore, (i) φ/K < S < S < S if
and only if ̺(ω, φ) > 0 and (ii) φ/K < S < S < S if and only if ̺(ω, φ) < 0. Q.E.D.
Step D. It remains to show that, up to a zero-measure set, the above parameter domains form a partition of
X = {(S, σf) | 0 < S < 1, 0 < σf}. Hence, there exists a unique organizational equilibrium almost everywhere in X.
(D.1) The equilibrium conditions for the 10 equilibrium configurations obtained in Appendix 2 and in Step B can
be rewritten as follows.
(1) (H - H) is an equilibrium in the set
A1 ≡

(S, σf) | 0 < σf < (ω − φ)S
ω + S
, 0 < S < 1

.
(2) (IH - H) is an equilibrium in A2 ∪A3 where
A2 ≡

(S, σf) | (ω − φ)S
ω + S
< σf <
(ω − φ)S
φ+ S
, 0 < S < S ,
A3 ≡

(S, σf) | (ω − φ)S
ω + S
< σf <
ω − φ
1 + ωS
, S < S < 1 .
(3) (I - H) is an equilibrium in A4 ∪A5 where
A4 ≡

(S, σf) | (ω − φ)S
φ+ S
< σf <
(1− φω)S
φ+ S
, 0 < S < S ,
A5 ≡

(S, σf) | (ω − φ)S
φ+ S
< σf <
ω − φ
1 + ωS
, S < S < S .
(4) (IH - IH) is an equilibrium in A6 where
A6 ≡

(S, σf) | ω − φ
1 + ωS
< σf <
(ω − φ)S
φ+ S
, S < S < 1 .
(5) (I - IV) is an equilibrium in A7 where
A7 ≡

(S,σf) | (ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS) < σf,
φ
K
< S < S

.
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(6) (I - VH) is an equilibrium in A8 ∪A9 where
A8 ≡

(S, σf) | (1− φω)S
φ+ S
< σf <
(1− φω)S
φ+ φωS
, 0 < S <
φ
K

,
A9 ≡

(S, σf) | (1− φω)S
φ+ S
< σf <
ω − φ
1 + ωS
,
φ
K
< S < S .
(7) (I - IVH) is an equilibrium in A10 ∪A11 where
A10 ≡

(S, σf) | ω − φ
1 + ωS
< σf <
(ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS) ,
φ
K
< S < S ,
A11 ≡

(S, σf) | (1− φω)S
φ+ S
< σf <
(ω − φ)(1− φω)(1 + S)
(1− φ2)(1 + ωS) ,
S < S < S .
(8) (I - IH) is an equilibrium in B1 ∪B2 ∪B3 if and only if S < S where
B1 ≡

(S, σf) | ω − φ
1 + ωS
< σf <
(1− φω)S
φ+ S
, S < S < S ,
B2 ≡

(S, σf) | (ω − φ)S
φ+ S
< σf <
(1− φω)S
φ+ S
, S < S < S ,
B3 ≡

(S, σf) | (ω − φ)S
φ+ S
< σf <
ω − φ
1 + φS
, S < S < 1

;
and in the set C1 ∪C2 ∪C3 if and only if S < S where
C1 ≡

(S, σf) | ω − φ
1 + ωS
< σf <
(1− φω)S
φ+ S
, S < S < S ,
C2 ≡

(S, σf) | ω − φ
1 + ωS
< σf <
ω − φ
1 + φS
, S < S < S ,
C3 ≡

(S, σf) | (ω − φ)S
φ+ S
< σf <
ω − φ
1 + Sφ
, S < S < 1 .
(9) (I - V) is an equilibrium in A12 where
A12 ≡

(S, σf) | (1− φω)S
φ+ φωS
< σf, 0 < S <
φ
K

.
(10) (I - I) is an equilibrium in A13 where
A13 ≡

(S, σf) | ω − φ
1 + φS
< σf,S < S < 1

.
In the next step, we show that, up to a zero-measure set, the sets Ai (i = 1, ..., 13), Bj (j = 1, 2, 3), and Ck
(k = 1, 2, 3) form a partition of X.
(D.2) Set
X1 = {(S, σf) : 0 < σf, 0 < S < φ/K} , X2 =


(S, σf) : 0 < σf, φ/K < S < S ,
X3 =


(S, σf) : 0 < σf, S < S < S , X4 = 
(S, σf) : 0 < σf, S < S < S , X5 = (S, σf) : 0 < σf, S < S ,
X6 =


(S, σf) : 0 < σf, S < S < S , X7 = 
(S, σf) : 0 < σf, S < S < S , X8 = 
(S, σf) : 0 < σf, S < S .
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Then, we have:
X = X1 ∪X2 ∪X3 ∪X4 ∪X5 ⇔ S < S up to a zero-measure set, (S.18)
X = X1 ∪X2 ∪X6 ∪X7 ∪X8 ⇔ S < S up to a zero-measure set, (S.19)
Furthermore, it is readily verified that the sets X1, X2, X3, X4, and X5 are pairwise disjoint. Consequently, up to a
zero-measure set, {X1,X2,X3,X4,X5} is a partition of X. The same holds for {X1,X2,X6,X7,X8}.
Using the definition of Ai, Bi, and Ci in (S.18), the sets X1 and X2 are as follows:
X1 = ((A1 ∪A2 ∪A4) ∩X1) ∪A8 ∪A12, (S.20)
X2 = ((A1 ∪A2 ∪A4) ∩X2) ∪A9 ∪A10 ∪ (A7 ∩X2). (S.21)
Furthermore, the sets ((A1 ∪A2 ∪A4) ∩X1), A8, and A12 are mutually disjoint. The same holds for (A1∪A2∪A4)∩
X2, A9, A10, A7 ∩X2.
When S < S, the sets X3, X4, and X5 are such that
X3 = ((A1 ∪A2) ∩X3) ∪A5 ∪B1 ∪ ((A7 ∪A11) ∩X3),
X4 = ((A1 ∪A3 ∪A6) ∩X4) ∪B2 ∪ ((A7 ∪A11) ∩X4) , (S.22)
X5 = ((A1 ∪A3 ∪A6) ∩X5) ∪B3 ∪A13.
Furthermore, the sets (A1 ∪ A2) ∩ X3, A5, B1, and (A7 ∪ A11) ∩ X3 are mutually disjoint. The same holds for
(A1 ∪A3 ∪A6) ∩X4, B2, and (A7 ∪A11) ∩X4, and for (A1 ∪A3 ∪A6) ∩X5, B3, and A13.
When S < S, the sets X6, X7, and X8 are as follows:
X6 = ((A1 ∪A2 ∪A5) ∩X6) ∪C1 ∪A11 ∪ (A7 ∩X6) ,
X7 = ((A1 ∪A2 ∪A5) ∩X7) ∪C2 ∪ (A13 ∩X7) , (S.23)
X8 = (A1 ∩X8) ∪A3 ∪A6 ∪C3 ∪ (A13 ∩X8) .
Furthermore, the sets (A1 ∪A2 ∪A5) ∩ X6, C1, A11, and A7 ∩ X6 are mutually disjoint. The same holds for
(A1 ∪A2 ∪A5) ∩X7, C2, and A13 ∩X7, and for A1 ∩X8, A3, A6, and C3, A13 ∩X8.
Thus, up to a zero-measure set, all subsets of Xi (i = 1, ..., 8) is a partition of Xi.
(D.3) Set I = {1, ..., 13} and J = K = {1, 2, 3}.
(1) It is readily verified that Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ I; Bj = ∅ for all j ∈ J if and only if S < S; and Ck = ∅ for all
k ∈ K if and only if S < S.
(2a) Substituting (S.20)-(S.21) into (S.18) yields (∪i∈IAi) ∪ (∪j∈JBj) = X almost everywhere when S < S.
(2b) Substituting (S.20)-(S.21) and (S.23) into (S.19) yields (∪i∈IAi) ∪ (∪k∈KCk) = X almost everywhere when
S < S.
(3a) If i ∈ I, l ∈ I, and i = l, then Ai ∩Al = ∅.
(3b) If j ∈ J , m ∈ J , and j =m, then Bj ∩Bm = ∅; if i ∈ I and n ∈ J , then Ai ∩Bn = ∅ when S < S.
(3c) If k ∈ K, r ∈ K, and k = r, then Ck ∩Cr = ∅; if i ∈ I and t ∈ K, then Ai ∩Ct = ∅ when S < S. Q.E.D.
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